

D

619

.A8

1918a

THE NEW
AND
AMERICA
ASHELY



Class D619

Book A3

Copyright N^o 1916

COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT.



THE ASHLEY BOOKS
ON
THE NEW SOCIAL SCIENCE
FOR
SECONDARY SCHOOLS

EARLY EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION 715 pages \$1.60

ANCIENT CIVILIZATION 350 pages \$1.20

MEDIEVAL CIVILIZATION 365 pages \$1.20

MODERN EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION *In press*

AMERICAN HISTORY (REVISED) 580 pages \$1.60


THE NEW CIVICS 420 pages \$1.20

THE WAR AND AMERICA

WAR CITIZENSHIP LESSONS

**IT IS NOT AN ARMY THAT WE MUST
SHAPE AND TRAIN; IT IS A NATION**

**President Wilson's
Selective Service Act Proclamation,
May 18, 1917.**





© Underwood and Underwood

PRESIDENT WILSON

THE
WAR AND AMERICA

WAR CITIZENSHIP LESSONS

BY

ROSCOE LEWIS ASHLEY

AUTHOR OF

"THE AMERICAN FEDERAL STATE"

"MODERN EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION"

"AMERICAN GOVERNMENT"

ETC.

New York

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1918

All rights reserved

II 619

.A8

1918a

COPYRIGHT

1917-18, THE PASADENA HIGH SCHOOL

1918, THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Norwood Press

J. S. Cushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co.
Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.

NOV 21 1918

©CL.A 506673

CONTENTS

I. GENERAL

	PAGE
1. HOW GERMANY SOUGHT TO DOMINATE THE WORLD	1
Formation of the Triple Alliance	1
Expansion — The Bagdad Railway	2
Imperialist Plans and a Place in the Sun	4
Menace of German Ideas and "Welt-politik"	4
2. HOW EUROPE WAS AROUSED AGAINST GERMANY	8
Formation of the Dual Alliance	8
England and France Reach an Understanding	9
The Algeciras Conference and the Triple Entente	11
Balkan Crises Leading to War	12
3. HOW THE WAR CAME TO AMERICA	15
How All Europe Became Embroiled in War	15
Efforts of America to Remain Neutral	17
Events Leading Directly to War	19
Direct, Fundamental, and Immediate Causes of War	20
"Frightfulness" and Atrocities as Causes of War	21
Preparation for Entering the War	23
Why We Are at War — A Summary	24
4. THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY — THE GENERAL PROBLEM	28
Comprehension	28
Loyalty	31
Coöperation	33
Economy and Efficiency	35
How We Must Defeat Germany. A Summary	37

II. FINANCE, FOOD, AND CLOTHING

5. HELPING UNCLE SAM FINANCE THE WAR	40
The Cost of the War	40
War Taxation	43
Loans and Thrift Stamps	44

	PAGE
6. THE CLOTHING PROBLEM AND THE WAR	49
Elements of the Food and Clothing Problems	49
The Shortage of Cotton and Wool	51
Conservation Program for High School Students	54
7. THE FOOD PROBLEM	57
General	57
The World's Food Shortage	58
The Problem of Increased Production	60
The Problem of Food Saving	62
The Schools and Food Production	65
The High School and the Food Conservation Problem	66
III. REORGANIZATION	
8. UNCLE SAM'S FIGHTING FORCES	70
Raising an Army	70
The Army Cantonment	72
Aviation and Naval Services — Officers	74
9. WAR REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT	79
New Bureaus and Boards — Work Accomplished	79
New Concentration and Proposed Unification	81
Some Auxiliary War Organizations	83
The Shipping Problem	86
10. REORGANIZATION OF SCHOOL WORK	90
The General Problem	90
General Preparation	92
CONCLUSION	96
APPENDIX I	
Using worn materials	101
APPENDIX II	
Draft classes	102

SUGGESTIONS FOR TEACHERS

FOR our schools the present crisis brings new opportunities and added responsibilities. Few of our high school students are old enough to fight for Uncle Sam at the front; but if all understand the need, very few indeed will shirk any patriotic duty, however small, that arises. The first year of the war brought to our schools a new earnestness, a greater loyalty, a more complete consecration than we had ever known. Many of our failures have been due to ignorance and inexperience, but we are learning. That we may learn faster, that we may learn better, that we help more, is our first need and our greatest desire.

The primary purpose of these patriotic lessons is not information but action. Since the schools are preëminently that branch of our social organization which works through information to knowledge, and through knowledge to character and potential efficiency, it is necessary that the lessons consider causes briefly and that they inquire a little into the nature of the problems to be considered. It is hoped that they may give some insight into war needs and help to develop a "war conscience" that is sensitive to personal obligations. Their appeal is to the individual, to know the right way, and to avoid little blunders, of which we are usually unconscious, which indirectly help the enemy. They aim to show also that patriotism is more than a matter of individual comprehension; that it calls for coöperation of small groups such as classes and of large groups such as schools.

The topics of these War Citizenship Lessons include some of those used originally by the writer in his own classes. When the complete list was shown to Mr. Walter C. Wilson, Principal of the Pasadena High School, he suggested that they be prepared in written form and presented to other students. At the request of Mr. Will C. Wood, Commissioner of Secondary Education, the lessons of this booklet, and one or two others, were then published

by the California State Board of Education for the higher schools of that state. For use in this edition they have been revised carefully and in part rewritten to meet present needs. The writer's thanks are due to many for interest and suggestions, and especially to Miss Grace Fisher of the Pasadena High School, who wrote part of Lesson 6 and gave suggestions on Lesson 7.

The Lessons can be used by all students of high schools and upper grammar grades (intermediate or junior high schools). The greater the student's background of historical and scientific knowledge, the more valuable they can be made. For one who is completing or intends to take a course in the social sciences, they supplement admirably a study of the past, and of general conditions of the present, because current history should be closely correlated with such a course. Current history may be just as necessary to any other student, but it means more to one who has the greater knowledge from which to interpret to better advantage both present changes and present problems.

Presentation to all students would necessarily require a method different from that of an ordinary recitation. If all students have access to a copy of the pamphlet, they should be asked to read the material carefully, and to answer some questions, most of which are probably not designated in advance, but they should spend most of the time discussing topics that are live and interesting because touching their own lives. On the contrary, if the Lessons form part of a course in civics, history, or English, each pupil would naturally have a copy of his own and would treat that copy as a text to be used as much as any other text. Certainly the main object of patriotic instruction ought not to be information, or even comprehension, but inspiration.

PASADENA, CAL.

SEPTEMBER, 1918.

THE WAR AND AMERICA

I. GENERAL

1. HOW GERMANY SOUGHT TO DOMINATE THE WORLD

THE modern German Empire is less than fifty years old. For a thousand years before the present empire was organized the name Germany was applied to all central Europe from the North and Baltic seas to the Adriatic Sea. By a series of wars, beginning in 1864 and ending in 1871, *Bismarck, the Imperial Chancellor, through a policy of "blood and iron," welded together old Germany, with the exception of Austria, into a new Germany*, of which the king of Prussia was head, with the title of German emperor or kaiser.

FORMATION OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Bismarck directed the affairs of Germany for nearly twenty years after her unification was completed. During that time he sought to work out a large number of internal problems and really unite the German people. The chief aim of his foreign policies immediately after 1871 was *the isolation of France*. Another policy, which became more and more important as the years passed, was the bringing together of Germany and friendly neighboring countries into an alliance. Such an alliance would protect Germany against her enemies, and it would aid her in carrying out the dominating idea of Bismarck's policy, namely, that Germany should be supreme in Europe. At first he brought together the rulers of Germany, Austria, and Russia, who formed an unofficial group known as the "*League of the Three Emperors*."

Before many years had passed, however, Bismarck discovered that Austria would not work with Russia, because each wanted to

control the Balkan area in her own interests. In 1879, therefore, Bismarck made an alliance with Austria which united these two German nations. Three years later he persuaded Italy to join Germany and Austria in a *Triple Alliance*, which continued in existence until the opening of the Great War. By this alliance each country promised to come to the help of the others if war was made upon the latter. If a member of the alliance however, began the war, then the other members were not under obligation to support her. As Italy believed Germany to be the aggressor in the present Great War, she refused to remain in the alliance after the war broke out.

EXPANSION — THE BAGDAD RAILWAY

Bismarck was absorbed in making Germany the greatest power in Europe. Even in the *Balkan question* in southeastern Europe he was not greatly interested, as is shown in his statement that it was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier. The interest of the alliance in that day in the Balkans was therefore almost exclusively for the purpose of protecting Austria and her interests against Russian influence in the Near East. After Bismarck retired from office (1890), however, and the present kaiser, Wilhelm II, who believes thoroughly in his divine right to rule, began to manage German affairs, Germany took a far greater interest than before in *colonies*, in the *expansion of foreign commerce*, in a *navy*¹ to protect her commerce, and in acquiring *world dominion*. Pan-Germanism, originally intended to be a union of all German peoples in central Europe, became a scheme for control of both continents.

Even in Bismarck's time *colonies were acquired* in different parts of Africa. Later, Germany obtained some islands in the Pacific Ocean and a sphere of influence in China. Her plans for expansion depended less upon colonies than upon control of the world's commerce. *The development of Germany economically* began with the creation of the German Empire in 1871. It included the establishment of a *great banking system* which extended credit to German manufacturers and merchants within the empire and in many

¹ See page 10.

foreign countries. It depended even more on the development of *huge shops and factories* which were carefully fostered by the state. As a rule these were equipped with fine machinery and manned by skilled workers trained in municipal and state technical schools. It was fostered directly by the rapid development of *German trade* throughout the Old World and New. This development of foreign business was not accidental and haphazard; it was part of a huge scheme to gain control of the markets of the world. Cheap and inferior goods were able to undersell better products of their rivals. German goods were often sold cheaper than British or American goods of the same quality, because German banks and the German navy and in fact the whole scheme of German politics were used to give her merchants the advantage of her rivals. If German merchants could not compete on equal terms, the government offered direct help which enabled them to outbid and undersell their competitors. In these ways, by "peaceful penetration," Germany was securing a commercial grip on the world and also paving the way for world domination, which was to be political as well as economic.

[The *area* over which Germany sought first to establish her rule or her influence stretched across Europe and part of Asia *from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf*. During the last years of the nineteenth century, and particularly during the first years of the twentieth, she sought to erect and control a *huge and important railroad system* from the coast of Asia Minor opposite Constantinople *across Asia Minor and Mesopotamia to Bagdad*, near the site of ancient Babylon. This we know as the "Berlin to Bagdad" railway. Great Britain, however, first prevented her getting a seaport on the Persian Gulf, and secondly, in an agreement with Russia (by which the Triple Entente was completed in 1907¹), gained for England and Russia control in Persia. In these ways the railroad to Bagdad was robbed of the opportunity to increase German commerce to the Indian ocean and, temporarily at least, lost all the influence which Germany had hoped it would have in creating a world empire.

¹ See page 12.

IMPERIALIST PLANS AND A PLACE IN THE SUN

Germany not only wished to extend her dominion southeast to the Persian Gulf in order *to control a strip completely across Europe and Asia* which would threaten British possessions in Egypt and India, but she also wanted *control of harbors opposite England*, from which she could strike that country, and by which also the commerce of western Germany would find a more direct outlet to the outside world. As the Rhine is the greatest river of western Germany, she naturally would desire control of *the mouth of the Rhine*, which is in Holland. As Antwerp in Belgium, however, is a better port for foreign commerce, the Germans planned to seize *Antwerp* and occupy as much of Belgium as was necessary to carry out their scheme of world dominion. If these countries resisted and she were forced to conquer them, not only would Germany be content with the European countries and their ports, but she would be glad to gain the *valuable Dutch colonies* in the East Indies and in the West Indian islands or in South America near our Panama canal. The Belgian Congo, which connects former German colonies in East and West Africa, would also have been acceptable to her, because then Germany would have had *a strip clear across Africa* as well as one across Europe and Asia. As most of the territory of the world which is desirable for European colonization was occupied by other Europeans at the time Germany began to acquire colonies, she has felt that she was justified in seizing old colonies of other countries, if possible, in order to have her "*place in the sun*." Unfortunately for us, German plans for world dominion included the *New World* as well as the Old. Early in the year 1917, while we desired the friendship of Germany, and, at considerable sacrifice had remained neutral, the German foreign minister, Zimmermann, tried to plot with Mexico and Japan against the United States.

MENACE OF GERMAN IDEAS AND "WELT-POLITIK"

We Americans did not know very much about Germany's plan for world domination, at least until 1917, nor do we know very much yet about many German ideas. We understand, of course, that Germany is an autocracy ruled by landed aristocrats called

the junkers. We know that in past centuries Prussia and at the present time the German Empire believe thoroughly in militarism as the best means for protecting themselves and carrying out their plans. The Germans have a saying that, in their dealing with one another, nations must be either hammer or anvil. They believed that most of the time before 1871 they had played anvil to their neighbors' hammers. Since they have become organized, and especially since they have been developing a plan of world dominion, they have been determined that they should serve as a hammer to strike heavy blows on the anvils of others.

Besides militarism, many German ideas and institutions belong to the centuries earlier than the nineteenth. Indeed, the attitude of the state toward the individual German reminds us strongly of the Middle Ages. Even at the present time, the undemocratic organization of the German government is shown by the fact that the popularly elected branch of the imperial parliament, the "Reichstag," has practically no power in governing Germany, for the control of affairs is left with the upper house of the parliament, the "Bundesrath," made up of *German princes* or their representatives. Coöperating with these German princes are the kaiser and his councilors, the chief of whom is the chancellor, an official responsible only to the kaiser, not to the parliament. We would naturally have little sympathy with such a Germany, ruled by a war party which believes that whatever the state does is right, in short, that *might makes right*.

We are just as strongly opposed to the idea that the majority of the German people seem to have accepted, at least since the war broke out, namely, that they have the best civilization in the world, that they are far more intellectual and efficient than any other people, and *that they have a mission to perform, by war if necessary, in forcing their civilization upon others and bringing others under German control and domination.* Just as the United States, in dealing with the Indians, and Great Britain, in her relations with inferior races of the tropics, have felt that they had an obligation to civilize those peoples and rule them for their own good, an obligation which we call "The White Man's Burden," so Germany has the same feeling toward all white men who are so ignorant and so

obstinate that they have not accepted and possibly do not desire to accept the blessings of German civilization, which is called "*kultur*." The patriotic German has raised his glass in toast to "der Tag," the day when German *kultur* will be universal and Germany will be triumphant over all her foes, as expressed in that well-known phrase, "*Deutschland über Alles*." A world in arms against Germany shows the reception of her plans by those white peoples that she wanted to control.

REFERENCES

- Hazen, *Modern European History*, 341-383, 416-427.
 Ashley, *Modern European Civilization*, Chapters XII, XIV, XXI.
 Hayes, *Political and Social History of Modern Europe*, II, 180-206, 397-435, 679-697.
 Allen, *The Great War*, 60-106, 160-168.
 Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe*, 1-70.
 Coolidge, *Origins of the Triple Alliance*.
 Howe, *Socialized Germany*, 36-94, 321-335.
 Barker, *Modern Germany; Her Political and Economic Conditions*, 1-197, 270-383.
 Seymour, *The Diplomatic Background of the War*, 1-37, 61-114, 194-206.
 Von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*.
 Gerard, *My Four Years in Germany*.
 Naumann, *Central Europe*.
 Hauser, *Germany's Commercial Grip on the World*.
 Usher, *Pan-Germanism*.
 Chéradame, *The Pan-German Plot Unmasked*.
 Fife, *The German Empire between Two Wars*.

QUESTIONS

1. How was the term Germany used before 1866? What two countries first joined in the alliance which was afterward known as the Triple Alliance? Which was the third country and why did it fail to remain in the alliance after 1914?
2. When did Germany begin to take an active interest in Pan-Germanism and world politics? Explain what part was played in these schemes: (a) by colonies, (b) by the industrial development of

Germany, (c) by the expansion of foreign commerce, (d) by a navy, and (e) by political influence in foreign countries.

3. Where was the Bagdad railway and what was its object? Why do we speak of a "Berlin to Bagdad" railway? What would have been the commercial importance and what would have been the political importance of a German dominion from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf? of the new plan via Ukraine and the Caucasus?

4. Give at least two reasons why Germany would wish to control both Belgium and Holland. Show how the acquisition of the Belgian and Dutch colonies would have fitted very well into the German scheme of world domination.

5. Who are the junkers and what part have they played in the government of Germany? Name some of the German ideas which are barbaric and out of date. Explain that Germany is undemocratic.

6. What is kultur? What is meant by the phrase "Deutschland uber Alles"? To what extent do the Germans treat any other white peoples as equals?

7. Name all the reasons you can give from your reading of Lesson I to show why the other European countries were aroused against Germany before 1914.

2. HOW EUROPE WAS AROUSED AGAINST GERMANY

(Before 1914)

FORMATION OF THE DUAL ALLIANCE

As we noticed in the previous lesson, it was Germany's foreign policy in the years following 1871 to isolate France but to keep on friendly terms with all other countries. She did this rather successfully for about twenty years, except on two or three occasions. In 1875 the German war party was disgusted because France had paid off within so short a time the huge war indemnity of a billion dollars assessed at the close of the Franco-Prussian War. The German war lords were alarmed also at the reorganization of the French army and were chagrined because France had erected a chain of defensive forts at Verdun and elsewhere on her eastern border. *Preparations were made to invade France once again* in order to humiliate her more completely. This plan was foiled by the alertness of the French diplomats, who asked the British and Russian governments to intercede in behalf of the new French Republic. When protests were presented in Berlin, the German officials denied that they had ever thought of attacking France again. The incident is significant as showing that, even as early as 1875, when both Great Britain and Russia were on quite friendly terms with Germany, they were willing to join with France against the arrogant military plans of the German Empire.

Russian feeling against Germany was really first aroused in 1878. By the Treaty of Berlin, after the Russo-Turkish War, victorious Russia gained practically nothing, whereas Austria was allowed to "occupy and administer" *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, simply as the price of her neutrality. Some years later, Russia learned that Germany had joined in an alliance¹ with Austria for the express purpose of fighting Russia, if necessary. Without delay the Rus-

¹ See page 12.

sians began to look to the French for support, and in 1891 those two countries formed the *Dual Alliance* against Germany. This alliance assured Russia the money which she needed for building her railroads and the making of other necessary and valuable improvements; and, by giving France an international friend, it brought to an end her period of isolation. It is interesting to notice that soon after this alliance was made a Russian fleet visited the French harbor of Toulon, and Russian sailors, arm-in-arm with French jackies, strolled down the streets singing the Marseillaise, the hymn of republican France, whose use was forbidden within the territories of the tsar of all the Russias.

ENGLAND AND FRANCE REACH AN UNDERSTANDING

While Bismarck was trying to keep France isolated, he encouraged her to seek new colonies, especially in Africa. With his usual unscrupulous diplomacy, he urged France to acquire Tunis, opposite Sicily, because *Italy* wanted Tunis. In this way he aroused in Italy hatred toward France and induced Italy in 1882 to join Germany and Austria in the Triple Alliance. *Bismarck's chief hope, however, was that in time England and France would come into conflict because of their colonial claims*, as they had done on the North American continent and in India in the middle of the eighteenth century. When their expanding colonial empires did clash, he expected that Great Britain would join Germany and accept his leadership more completely than ever before.

In 1898, after the retirement and death of Bismarck, it looked as though that far-seeing statesman was right. A small French force under Captain Marchand crossed the burning sands of the Sahara Desert into the Egyptian Sudan in order to extend French sway into the upper valley of the Nile river. It happened that Kitchener of Khartoum, who had just completed the conquest of the Sudan, was in the neighborhood. He immediately came to Fashoda where Marchand was and insisted that the French should leave the Nile valley to Great Britain. The French people were quite indignant, but the new minister of foreign affairs, Delcassé, an ardent enemy of Germany, urged the French to withdraw their claims to any part of the Nile basin.

Strangely enough, *the Fashoda affair did not make England and France enemies*; on the contrary it was used by Delcassé, after the accession of King Edward VII, as the basis for a new friendship between the two countries. The way had been prepared for this in Great Britain. For several years there had been a *growing bitterness among Englishmen against Germany*. The old friendship between the two countries was on the wane before the kaiser, in 1896, sent his famous *telegram to Oom Paul Kruger*, President of the Transvaal Republic, congratulating him on the capture of some English raiders who had started an insurrection in the Transvaal. The hostility of the English toward the Germans was aroused still more when *Emperor William at Damascus in 1898* publicly proclaimed to the three hundred million Mohammedans of the world that he was their friend. England believed that German friendship for the Mohammedans in Egypt and in India was a menace to her rule in northern Africa and in southern Asia.

England's friendship for Germany, however, stood those tests, but it did not survive the creation of *a great German navy*. Great Britain believes rightly that not simply her sovereignty as a European nation, but her very existence, depend upon her control of the seas. When the Germans, therefore, began to build dreadnaughts in larger numbers than the English, the latter immediately took alarm, because of the nightmare of an invasion from Germany, or interference by Germany with their commerce or imperial policies. The English were therefore ready to join their ancient enemies, France and Russia, against the aggressive and domineering policy of the Germans, who were now the most formidable of Britain's foes. In 1904 England and France reached an understanding, the "*Entente Cordiale*," by which they agreed to be friends and to protect each other's interests in northern Africa. Great Britain was to have a free hand in Egypt, whereas France was to be allowed to develop Morocco without interference. *France now had the friendship of two great nations, Great Britain and Russia*. In case of trouble with Germany she could count at least on the moral support of the former and on the military aid of the latter.

THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE AND THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

In 1904-05 the Russians were decisively defeated by the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War. The kaiser took advantage of the failure of the only *ally* France had at that time to interfere with French rights and interests in Morocco. He demanded that a conference of the great Powers should be called to curb alleged French aggressions in that country. Rather than oppose the kaiser in this warlike, domineering mood, and risk a direct blow from the "mailed fist," the French people dismissed Delcassé and agreed to the conference, although it hurt their pride and injured their prestige. The conference was held at Algeciras, almost under the shadow of Gibraltar. Whenever a vote was taken, Germany had the support of only one of the Powers, Austria, for even Italy had again become friendly with France, largely through the influence of Delcassé. To be sure, the conference declared that Morocco was under the protection of all the Powers, but France, with the negligible assistance of Spain, was allowed to control the police system and the finances of the country. It can thus be seen that *the work of the Algeciras Conference was a serious blow to German leadership in Europe.*¹

At the Algeciras conference the British and Russian envoys had many talks together. They believed that their countries should bury the hatchet and smoke the pipe of peace. The next year it was easy, therefore, for England and Russia to get together, because they feared the German scheme of expansion *via* the "Berlin to Bagdad railway" to the Persian Gulf. They agreed to compromise their differences in Asia and to divide *Persia* into a northern sphere of influence controlled by Russia, a southern sphere controlled by Great Britain, and a neutral zone between. Since France was already allied with Russia, and England had an understanding with France, the three countries practically created a new Grand Alliance, known, however, simply as the "Triple Entente."

¹ The Morocco crisis of 1905 was succeeded by others. In 1911 one of these, known as the "Agadir affair," threatened for months to disturb the peace of Europe. Great Britain informed Germany that if war were made on France, she would help the French. Germany then yielded, but she immediately began preparing for a war, since diplomacy had failed to give her what she wanted.

To all practical purposes Europe was now divided into two great groups, the central, consisting of the *Triple Alliance*, which was discussed in the preceding article, and the other, composed of the most important powers in eastern and western Europe, that is, the *Triple Entente*. It would seem as though these two groups of nations would tend to create a balance of power and therefore to maintain the peace of Europe. Undoubtedly they would have done so but for the aggressive spirit of the Teutonic countries, which were not satisfied with the prestige and power they already enjoyed in Europe, but insisted upon making further trouble outside or in demanding far more than they had on that Continent.

BALKAN CRISES LEADING TO WAR

In 1908 there occurred in Turkey a revolution by which the young Turks gained control of the government. Austria took advantage of the resulting confusion and *incorporated the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, which according to the Treaty of Berlin (1878) were under her control but were still under the suzerainty of the Turkish sultan. Russia protested against this violation of a treaty. She was particularly aggrieved because she hoped in time to unite under her own protection all of the Balkan states, which are inhabited chiefly by Slavic peoples who are allied in race to the Russians. She even went so far as to begin mobilizing her troops. Immediately the kaiser "donned his shining armor" and "shook his sword in its scabbard." The Russian army, demoralized by the war with Japan and further demoralized by the Russian Revolution of 1905-06, was in no condition to meet the forces of Germany. So Russia backed down.

In 1912-13, after Italy had made war successfully upon Turkey, the Balkan states, which had already formed a Balkan union, also fought Turkey, in order to take from her provinces inhabited almost entirely by Slavic peoples. Turkey in Europe was confined to a very small corner of southeastern Europe; thereafter she reached only from Constantinople to Adrianople. Each of the Balkan states and Greece increased its area considerably. Austria was alarmed for fear that the Slavic peoples of the Balkans would try, even more actively than in previous years, to unite not only the

Slavic races of the Balkan states but to include also the Slavs in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as those who lived in southern Hungary. The crown prince of Austria was one of the most active opponents of this Pan-Balkan and Pan-Slavic policy. His assassination at Serajevo, late in June, 1914, gave Austria an excuse to demand of Serbia, one of the chief Balkan states, that she should publicly and completely put an end to this agitation. *Austria's ultimatum, delivered late in July, 1914, would have left Serbia neither independence nor self-respect. Russia thereupon protested.* When it became evident that Russia would protect Serbia, the German war party once more tried to intimidate Russia by rattling the sword in the scabbard, but this time Russia refused to back down. Within a week practically all Europe was embroiled in a war "made in Germany."

REFERENCES

Hayes, *Political and Social History of Modern Europe*, 691-710.

Ashley, *Modern European Civilization*, Chapter XXI.

Hart, *The War in Europe*, 78-103.

Von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, 60-122.

Lippmann, *The Stakes of Diplomacy*.

Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe*, 71-161, 343-350.

Seymour, *Diplomatic Background of the War*, 38-60, 115-194, 236-244.

Allen, *The Great War, Causes and Motives*, 80-203.

Fife, *The German Empire Between Two Wars*, 3-97.

Bullard, *The Diplomacy of the Great War*, 36-149.

Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*.

Rose, *The Development of the European Nations (1870-1914)*. Part II, 1-43, 320-384.

Fullerton, *Problems of Power*.

Schmitt, *England and Germany (1740-1914)*.

QUESTIONS

1. What were the peace terms at the end of the Franco-Prussian war in 1871? To what extent did Germany succeed in weakening France, and in isolating her as much as she expected? What was the war incident of 1875 and what effect did it have?

2. Why did Germany hate and fear Russia? Why have Austria and Russia been natural enemies? In 1878 why was Russia aroused against both Germany and Austria?

3. What countries organized the Dual Alliance? What did each gain from the alliance?

4. Why did Bismarck encourage France to gain colonies in Africa? What was the Fashoda affair and how was it used by Delcassé to improve the friendship between France and Great Britain?

5. Trace the development of British hostility to Germany, noting the influence of (a) German aggressions in general, (b) unfriendly acts of the present kaiser before 1900, and (c) the real menace of Germany's growing navy.

6. What was the "Entente Cordiale"? Why did it lead to the Triple Entente? Since there was a Triple Alliance, why was a defensive Triple Entente necessary? Did these groups of Powers maintain or menace the peace of Europe?

7. Did conditions in Morocco warrant a quarrel between the Powers? If not, why was the Algeiras Conference called? What effect did it have upon the great Powers of Europe?

8. If Austria had, according to the Treaty of Berlin, only the right to "occupy and administer" Bosnia and Herzegovina, what right had she to annex those provinces in 1908? Why did Russia protest against this action? Why did Germany threaten Russia with war? Why did Russia back down?

9. Did the Balkan wars give an advantage to the Balkan countries favored by Germany and Austria or to those which were friendly to Russia? To what extent did the Moroccan question and the Balkan question increase the military preparedness of the European countries? Why was the assassination of the crown prince of Austria an excuse rather than a reason for war?

NOTE. — As these studies are purely introductory to the main subject, "The Problems of the Nation and the Schools in Relation to the War," no attempt is made in later papers to give any account of military events since 1914.

3. HOW THE WAR CAME TO AMERICA

ON the sixth day of April, 1917, Congress adopted a resolution which opened with the sentence: "The state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared." It closed with the following forceful and significant words: "*To bring the conflict to a successful termination all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.*"¹

It is more than a hundred years since America has been involved in any European contest; it is nearly a century since we announced to the world, as the basis of the Monroe Doctrine, that we do not interfere in distinctively European affairs and that therefore European nations should refrain from interference in distinctively American affairs. At that time we stated "it is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defense." In the light of these principles of American foreign policy, it may be interesting to know HOW the United States was brought into a conflict which in 1915 seemed a distinctively European affair; we should like to understand WHY the United States became involved in a war which in the early months of 1917 ceased to be an affair of the Old World alone.

HOW ALL EUROPE BECAME EMBROILED IN WAR

About the first of August, 1914, the great Powers of Europe became involved in the greatest war of all history. The conflict started when Austria sent to Serbia a severe ultimatum, which Austria and Germany were confident would not be accepted either

¹ Lessons 3 and 4 and some others are long enough to constitute double lessons. It may be advisable before taking up each lesson to read the whole of each article. The rest of the first day spent on the lesson may then be devoted to a more careful study of the first part.

by Serbia or by Russia. Germany was willing to have the Balkan problem bring on a general war, because then she could demand that Austria support her policy to the very end, and for the further reason that expansion southeastward would help to bring the much-desired world empire from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf.¹ The time seemed especially favorable for Germany. Russia, which was thought to be unprepared, was suffering from a great strike, France was in the midst of difficulties started by a politician Caillaux, since found to have had treasonable dealings with Germany, and Great Britain had reached a most serious crisis due to Irish Home Rule problems. To a German war party, which had been preparing for forty years, — drilling, arming, and perfecting military methods, — equipped with magnificent field artillery and rejoicing in the possession of new siege guns of unexampled destructiveness, it seemed as though “the day” had come.

Serbia refused to yield on one of the points demanded by Austria because yielding on this point amounted to a virtual surrender of her national independence, and she was supported by Russia in her opposition. *Within three days the German troops were being mobilized* on the eastern border against Russia and on the western border against France. On the fourth of August the German troops invaded Belgium, partly because Belgium gave the most direct route to Paris, and partly because Germany desired the port of Antwerp, which Napoleon had graphically described as “a pistol pointed at the heart of England.” Great Britain immediately declared war. Legally, her opposition to Germany was based upon Germany’s violation of Belgium’s neutrality, which had been guaranteed by all the great Powers; actually, she did so because of Germany’s aggression against two other members of the Triple Entente, and because, if Russia and France were overpowered by the Central Empires, eventually the weight of Germany’s great military strength would be thrown against England. As Lord Northcliffe says, “Whether Prussia had invaded Belgium or not, Britain would have been obliged to fight in self-defense.” The first week of August England mobilized her entire fleet and later created *an actual blockade of German ports*. This was not a close-in blockade, similar

¹ See page 3.

to that maintained by the Union blockading fleets at the time of our Civil War, but it was completely effectual and therefore legally a true blockade, because it was impossible for commerce to go to or from Germany either through the narrow English Channel or through the wide opening of the North Sea between Scotland and Norway.

Besides these countries, many others became engaged in the war. Turkey and Bulgaria were drawn in on the side of the Central Empires. Italy made war on Austria to regain territory inhabited by Italians. Portugal, Rumania, and Greece joined the Entente Allies. The chief European neutrals at present are Spain, Switzerland, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries. *Practically all Europe was therefore involved in the war, but it remained until 1917 a European rather than a world conflict.*¹

EFFORTS OF AMERICA TO REMAIN NEUTRAL

At the very beginning of the war the United States declared her neutrality and the President urged that all American citizens be truly and strictly neutral. In accordance with the custom of all nations and ages, we left our ports open to the vessels of all countries on equal terms. At these ports foodstuffs, munitions of war, copper, and other materials necessary for war supplies could be obtained by any unarmed merchant vessel which served as an ocean carrier. Because of the blockade of the German ports which was maintained by Great Britain and her allies, it was impossible for German vessels to take advantage of these opportunities, but the merchantmen of the Allies and ships which flew the American flag carried these war supplies in constantly increasing quantities from our Atlantic sea-ports to the war area.

The primary purpose as well as the effect of the blockade was to keep Germany from getting war supplies, including food. In order to break this blockade and secure means by which German vessels could bring to that country supplies of food and necessary war materials, the Germans began early in the year 1915 the first submarine

¹ In 1915, Japan, allied to Great Britain, declared war on Germany. Among other countries that are involved in the war are Montenegro, Brazil, Cuba, China, Chile, Siam, and the United States.

warfare. These submarines were small, with limited sailing radii, and were soon hunted down and destroyed at the bases which had been established on the Irish coast. Their effect upon the blockade was practically negligible. Seeing this, *the German government adopted a policy of "frightfulness,"* which they hoped would destroy the ever-tightening cordon of blockading ships. All the world remembers that on the seventh day of May, 1915, *the British passenger steamship "Lusitania" was torpedoed from a submarine,* absolutely without warning. To be sure, German agents had notified passengers on the "Lusitania" that the vessel was marked for destruction, but no rule of war ever recognized by any civilized people could excuse the wanton and wholesale killing of women and children in such a manner. The sinking of the "Lusitania" resulted in a loss of life to 114 Americans, all of whom were neutrals and noncombatants. On protest of the American government, Germany relaxed her submarine policy, but she offered no satisfaction or proper explanation for this ruthless deed. Since, however, the sinking had occurred within the war zone, and Germany did modify her submarine policy and for months thereafter kept assuring us that she would not attack unarmed merchant vessels or passenger ships, the United States government did not follow up the "Lusitania" outrage by a declaration of war at that time. We must bear in mind, however, that, in spite of the fact that nearly two years elapsed before war was declared, *the sinking of the "Lusitania" was the first important event DIRECTLY (if not closely in time) connected with the outbreak of war between Germany and the United States.* After that outrage war could have been avoided only by the German government; instead that government sought simply to keep us out of the war and only refrained from too flagrant interference with our rights.

After months of patient waiting, during which several Americans lost their lives through submarines, in March, 1916, a French steamer, the "Sussex," plying between ports on either side of the English Channel, was sunk, together with many of her 325 passengers, among whom were American citizens. The United States government immediately protested in vigorous terms and on the eighteenth of April notified Germany that "the government of

the United States has been very patient," but it could tolerate no longer "the use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's commerce." We asserted that submarine warfare "is, of necessity, because of the very character of the vessels employed and the very methods of attack which their employment of course involves, utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and the sacred immunities of noncombatants." A few days later, on the fourth of May, the German imperial government notified President Wilson that *unarmed merchant vessels* "both within and without the area declared as naval war zone, *shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives*, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance."

EVENTS LEADING DIRECTLY TO WAR

Although the Germans did not keep that promise, there was at least some pretense of attempting to preserve it until the thirty-first of January, 1917, when the German ambassador notified the authorities in Washington that *on the following day a ruthless submarine campaign would begin, that an immense new war zone had been created, and that "all ships met within that zone will be sunk."* Immediately passports were handed to the ambassador, von Bernstorff, and Gerard, our ambassador at Berlin, was recalled.

The acts of Germany during the last week of January, 1917, were in a sense *a declaration of war* against all neutrals, and particularly against the United States. The German imperial government considered war with the United States inevitable as a result of this new ruthless submarine campaign. To be sure of this we have only to recall that before Germany told us of her new submarine plans, her foreign minister, Zimmermann, sent through her embassy in Washington papers which *urged Mexico to join with Germany and Japan in making war upon the United States*. Mexico's share of the spoils was to be Texas and our two newest states, Arizona and New Mexico. Japan was to find her compensation in territory on the Pacific coast.¹ Was there ever baser treachery to a neutral

¹ Japan, of course, had no knowledge of, or share in, this plot. Mexico repudiated the German proposal.

and friendly power, which had remained neutral in spite of the repeatedly broken promises of Germany, in spite of her perfidy, in spite of her intrigue? A week earlier the German ambassador in Washington had requested "authority to pay up to \$50,000 in order as on former occasions to influence Congress through the organization you know of, which can perhaps prevent war." As early as the first of February, 1917, we had come to the crossroads. The wonder is not that we declared war, but that we waited until April 6, 1917, after the Russian revolution had shown that, if we continued neutral, the Allies might be overwhelmed by the Central Empires.

Strangely enough, the events which showed that Germany was determined to have war with the United States followed closely President Wilson's great peace speech before the United States Senate, January 22, 1917. In this address, which will remain one of our most important state papers, President Wilson stated the principles upon which American democracy stands, urged the formation of a league to maintain the peace of the world, and brought out those conditions upon which the great conflict must be settled. This speech was, in a sense, the culmination of two and one-half years of statesmanship by which the President had sought, successfully to that time, to keep the United States out of the war. After the outbreak of the Russian revolution, however, the assistance of the United States was indispensable.

DIRECT, FUNDAMENTAL, AND IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF WAR

This brief survey gives us some idea of *historical events* which are connected chiefly with attacks upon, or attempts to protect, the neutral trade of the United States. *It outlines the most important changes in that series of events which was the DIRECT CAUSE of war with Germany.* In the case of the present war, as in all historical movements, direct or immediate causes must not be confused with the fundamental causes. In other words, although these events tell the story of *how* the war came to America, they do not necessarily explain *why* America is at war. To understand that, we must consider some of the *American principles* which were involved in our relations with Germany and show that the German method

of treating our trade was only one of a number of reasons why we are at war with Germany. When we recall the aggressive program of German "Weltpolitik,"¹ for example, we realize that if Great Britain, as well as France and Russia, should be unable to hold her own against Germany and her allies, in time the United States would bear the brunt of the struggle to make kultur dominant in the New World as in the Old. We naturally waited until we had proved that we were menaced by German expansion. When we had that proof, as we had in the spring of 1917, *we knew that SELF-PRESERVATION was the most fundamental cause of waging A WAR OF SELF-DEFENSE against Germany.*

ONE IMMEDIATE *but not direct* CAUSE was the way we were treated by German sympathizers in this country. In 1915 repeated attacks were made upon our property and industries by German agents who tried to destroy materials that might be used by the Allies. We know now that, before the outbreak of the Great War in Europe, there were numerous paid German spies in America seeking to create public sentiment favorable to Germany, even if it were necessary to corrupt American officials or to buy up American newspapers. After the war broke out, *the diabolically efficient but pernicious spy system of Germany* was extended. As Secretary Lane says, "She violated our confidence. Paid German spies filled our cities. Officials of her government, received as guests of this nation, lived with us to bribe and terrorize, defying our law and the law of nations."

"FRIGHTFULNESS" AND ATROCITIES AS CAUSES OF WAR

Not least of the reasons why we are at war with Germany is the fact that since the war began, the advocates of kultur have outraged all sense of decency and committed acts inexcusable, even in war. "With a fanatical faith in the destiny of German kultur as the system that must rule the world, the imperial government's actions have, through years of boasting, double dealing, and deceit, tended toward aggression upon the rights of others."² This is

¹ See pages 4 and 5.

² Committee on Public Information, "*How the War Came to America*," p. 21.

not the place to give a recital of the crimes against civilization committed by those to whom the name Hun has been applied, not inappropriately, it must be admitted. We have but to remember that Belgium's independence and neutrality were guaranteed by the nations, yet *Belgian independence was treated by the Prussian war party as a "scrap of paper."* Among the least of the offenses committed were the exaction of huge indemnities for reasons that even the invaders could not specify, the transportation of workers, the enslavement of men and women to help the Germans carry out their plans, the disregard for the rights of owners, and the devilish misuse of Belgian property. The list of *Belgian atrocities* should include the use of helpless girls and women as screens for advancing troops, the burning of towns, and the slaughter of unoffending inhabitants.

The policy of "frightfulness" which was used against Belgium was used with greater severity against *Serbia* and only less completely against *Poland*. *In the countries of the Entente Allies* that same policy led to air raids upon undefended towns and to the killing of defenseless women and children. *On the highways of the sea* it recognized no laws of humanity; even the hospital ships and the Red Cross vessels, labeled so that even the kultur-mad submarine commanders could read, seemed especially marked for destruction. In the *colonies of its opponents* sedition has been sown broadcast but secretly, and Holy Wars have been preached to subject peoples of non-Christian religions. "Its agents have conspired against the peace of neutral nations everywhere, sowing the seeds of dissension, ceaselessly endeavoring by tortuous methods of deceit, of bribery, false promises, and intimidation, to stir up brother nations one against the other, in order that the liberal world might not be able to unite, in order that autocracy might emerge triumphant from the war."¹

When we add to all this *the appeal of a stricken Europe*, her treaties broken, her fair lands desecrated, her homes invaded and wrecked, her peoples enslaved or transported, her men mutilated, her women wronged, her children murdered — not to satisfy

¹ Committee on Public Information, "*How the War Came to America*," p. 21.

savage instincts but as part of a hideous scheme of intimidation and terrorization — what alternative had we but to demand that Prussianism be destroyed?

PREPARATION FOR ENTERING THE WAR

One thing more we need to consider; why we maintained our neutrality as long as we did. Before February, 1917, in spite of all provocations we had kept out of the war and had enforced our neutrality. Notwithstanding the fact that conditions in Europe made strong appeals to our prejudices and our passions, we had remained impartial, had tried to suspend judgment, had declared that it was our first duty to remain neutral. There were several reasons why we did this. Foremost among these was our attachment to the *principles of our century-old Monroe Doctrine*. In accordance with this we refrained from any active share in a dispute which had its origin in Europe, so long as it could possibly be considered a European affair. Now that the European war had become a World War, the Monroe Doctrine no longer kept us from taking our rightful place by the side of the nations that were fighting Prussian autocracy and brutality.

As early as May, 1916, President Wilson declared that the conflict then raging was the last great war during which the United States could remain neutral. Even then, he admitted before the League to Enforce Peace, on May 27, 1916: "So sincerely do we believe these things that I am sure that I speak the mind and wish of the people of America when I say that *the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations* formed in order to realize these objects and make them secure against violation." In other words, the President recognized that, if necessary, we must abandon our policy of isolation and bear our share of the burden to stand for the principles of right and honor and all that is best in the world's civilization.

There was a second and even better reason why the United States desired to remain out of the war if possible. We were one of the great Powers, yet we had never joined with the others in the active management of the world's general affairs. When they had pinned their faith to huge armies or invincible navies and had been willing

to stake their prestige and their futures upon the use of secret diplomacy and intrigue, and if necessary on resort to arms, we had used other means appropriate for the greatest democracy on the face of the globe; we had pledged and we had practiced just regard for the rights of all nations, great or small; we had declared that nations derive their just powers only from the consent of the governed; and *we had refrained from war with the hope and the intention of bringing world peace.* By the year 1917, we were forced, not to abandon these principles, but to modify our practice, and in order that *the world might be made "safe for democracy," and "for the ultimate peace of the world and the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included," we made war upon war.* This in a sense is the true meaning of our declaration that war exists between democratic United States and the policy of domination of the arrogant autocracy which controls Germany and her allies.

WHY WE ARE AT WAR — A SUMMARY

It may be well to state again some reasons why we became engaged in war with Germany in the early months of the year 1917. In the first years of war there had been *interference with American commerce* and American citizens, but we were assured again and again either that Germany was not responsible or that the trouble would not recur. As the contest widened, however, the German government repeatedly broke its promises not to interfere with merchant or passenger ships, and while professing friendship for America because, as their highest officials later admitted, they "were not ready," made vast secret preparations to begin *a new and ruthless submarine warfare* which should make it impossible for any great nation to remain neutral.

When the Germans offered peace, or pretended to offer peace, in December, 1916, in such a way as to give them excuse for carrying on this assault upon humanity and its age-long rights upon the sea, when they filled our cities with spies and intrigued against the peace and honor of the American nation, when they called upon our southern neighbor, Mexico, and our Asiatic neighbor, Japan, to join with them in *war upon the United States*, which was remaining neutral under the most trying conditions possible; then the well-

known patience of the American people had reached a point beyond which it could not easily go. Then we could understand why the European nations forgot their old enmities and joined together, in order that Germany might not have what she proclaimed as her "place in the sun," really the opportunity to create a great world dominion and to press kultur upon her rivals as well as her dependents. In Europe before 1914 the place which Germany then held in the sun cast into the faces of neighboring peoples the dazzling glitter of a million steel-spiked helmets. By February, 1917, the sinister shadow, not of one million, but of five million, reached to the shores of America and spread to the Pacific, startling the American people out of their indifference and lethargy.

A state of war did exist between the United States and Germany; it was simply a question of time until the government of the United States should legally recognize the fact and take action against the disturber of the world's peace. At first we proposed armed neutrality, but that was but a temporary make-shift, a means of preparation for the real contest to follow. On the sixth of April, therefore, the government of the United States pledged all the resources of the country to bring to a successful termination this war, not simply to make the world safe for democracy, but by making war on war, to insure the peace of the world and to uphold the fundamental principles of modern civilization. *We fight Germany in order that government of autocracy, for kultur, by militarism, shall disappear from the face of the earth.*

REFERENCES

Ashley, *Modern European Civilization*, Chapter XXII.

Committee on Public Information, *How the War Came to America* :

(Wilson) *The President's Flag Day Address — with Evidence of Germany's Plans.*

(Wilson) *The War Message and the Facts Behind It.*

Lane and Baker, *The Nation in Arms.*

Lansing and Post, *A War of Self-Defense.*

Notestein and Stoll, *Conquest and Kultur.*

Tatlock, *Why America Fights Germany.*

Chéradame, *United States and Pan-Germanism*; *Atlantic*, 119, 721-731.

Wilson, *Why We Are at War*.

Roosevelt, *America and the World War*.

Rogers, W. A., *America's Black and White Book — Why We Are at War*.

Rogers, L., *America's Case against Germany*.

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July, 1917, *America's Relation to the World Conflict*.

Princeton University Press, *World Peril as Viewed from the Standpoints of Democracy*.

Johnson, *America and the Great War for Humanity and Freedom*.

Harding, *A Syllabus of the Great War*.

New International Encyclopedia, XXIII, 384-392; *International Year Book* (1916), 746-754.

The War Cyclopedica.

American Year Book (1914), 100-105; (1915), 1-69; (1916), 55-79.

QUESTIONS

1. When did the United States come into the Great War? To what extent did Congress pledge the men of the nation, the money, and the business, in order to win?

2. Can there be any doubt now that Germany started the war? Why were conditions especially favorable for her the last of July, 1914? Did Germany succeed in her plan to overwhelm by surprise and quick marches first France and then Russia?

3. Why was a blockade of German ports established at the beginning of the war? To what extent was there interference with commerce between America and Europe? If Germany had no share in foreign trade, was she justified in sinking unarmed merchant and passenger vessels in order to terrorize her opponents?

4. What was the "Lusitania" affair? Why was the "sinking of the 'Lusitania'" the first important event directly (if not closely in time) connected with the outbreak of war between Germany and the United States"? Why did we protest against German use of submarines?

5. Show that Germany was not square and did not play fairly in connection with: (a) submarine warfare, (b) treatment of our officials and people, (c) attempted intrigues with Mexico and Japan.

6. Explain as nearly as possible in President Wilson's own words: (a) how he tried to prevent war, (b) difficulties in staying out of the war, (c) conditions upon which the war must be settled, (d) why we are at war.

7. How important as causes of war were: (a) Germany's policy of world domination, (b) Germany's underhanded commercial and political methods, (c) German disregard for treaties and international law, (d) German frightfulness, (e) the menace to civilization of Prussianism?

8. To what extent did we refrain from entering the Great War before 1917: (a) on account of the Monroe Doctrine, and (b) our desire to end the war because we were the greatest neutral nation? What do we mean by making the world safe for democracy?

4. THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY — THE GENERAL PROBLEM

IN previous lessons we have noticed how Germany developed her plan for world domination, how Europe was aroused before the Great War against the arrogant policies of Germany, and both how and why the United States was drawn into the world conflict. Before we go on with the introductory study of specific problems, it may be desirable to notice very briefly some conditions which exist at present and some purely general phases of the war problem or problems.

COMPREHENSION

We cannot do anything for either ourselves or our country unless we know first what must be done. One reason why we have made a study of causes leading to the Great War in Europe and of the circumstances and conditions affecting our own entrance into the war is the fact that we cannot understand present problems without a knowledge of Germany's development, expansion, and plans for world dominion, as well as her autocratic rule, arrogant treatment of neutrals, and policy of brutality and "frightfulness." Knowledge of beginnings is valuable, but at the present time we are far less interested in either how the war broke out or why it came to America than *we are concerned with the problem of conducting the war and winning the war.* For those of us who are not actively engaged in the conflict, a study of the problems arising out of it is more important than almost anything else that we can do, because our knowledge at the best is limited, and our preparation to do our share in the work depends largely upon our grasp or comprehension of conditions and difficulties. If we obey the injunction of President Wilson, of United States Commissioner of Education Claxton, and of practically all our other great scholars

and leaders, we shall do our utmost, first of all, to remain in school as long as possible, and secondly, to make far more than we have ever done before of all our educational opportunities. This may seem to us a tame substitute for a real share in the war, and yet, by industry and patient study, in the truest sense *we may be "doing our bit"* by "doing our best."

When we say that we are fighting Germany we must keep in mind, as President Wilson has emphasized so many times, the distinction between the German imperial government and the German people. We must remember furthermore that for a non-militaristic nation to defeat soldiers once considered the best in the world, and the most completely organized people of Europe, steeped in traditions of militarism, thoroughly imbued with the doctrines of Prussianism, and dominated by a powerful war party, will require our utmost concentrated efforts. *We must crush Prussianism and help the German people find a true democracy.* But if, in the years to come, after the war is over, we find that Germany keeps a highly developed social organization and clings to many of her policies, there is probably only one way in which we shall be able to win another contest, one that is peaceful and economic, and that is by doing everything worth while better than she can do it. This seems a task worthy of the greatest nation of the world.

In the last fifty years Germany, once the most disunited state in Europe, has become the most unified nation, in which the individual exists for the state and in the state. Such a system makes it possible for the government to be all-powerful and use its authority in everyday affairs and in international crises quickly and effectively. *To her compactly organized social or national organization we must oppose another system, democratic and freer, and more intelligent, and therefore more highly if not more compactly organized.* In the eighteenth century we developed a *federal system* which made it possible for the separate American states to unite under a *written constitution*; we were thus able to organize a union on a much more flexible basis than was in use in Europe, a higher and better form of national organization than then existed anywhere else in the world. So to-day we must, if necessary, reorganize

our social system in order to form, in the words of our Constitution, "a more perfect Union."

In the American plan of letting each man enjoy the greatest possible individual freedom, *we must make the best use of personal initiative, voluntary coöperation, and efficient leadership, coupled with intelligent obedience and unselfish loyalty*; otherwise the German scheme of a closely knit social organization directed by the state, in which each person has his place assigned to him, will be more efficient than ours. In many respects their ideas and institutions are decidedly inferior to our own. Conspicuous among these is the doctrine of hate represented in the phrase "Gott strafe England." We must be careful that, in the intensity of our feeling, we do not copy just such defects. Of course, there is no danger that we shall be tempted to imitate German "frightfulness." Nevertheless, we must not only avoid their faults; we must really excel. *In place of schools run on an autocratic basis* and turning out well-disciplined and carefully prepared students who do not dare to fail, we must have schools in which teachers and pupils work in perfect harmony, in which pupils obey willingly, and do the right thing and the best thing without compulsion. *We must have schools which are democratic*, which are more efficient than those of Germany because they develop individuality, train our students to think, and prepare them for successful self-direction in later life. In short, in every interest and activity we can defeat German autocracy in the truest sense only by working out those *better methods*, applied with American skill and dexterity, and developed, because of the flexibility of our plan, to a far higher stage than is permitted in any compactly organized but artificial scheme such as that of the Germans.

More than twenty centuries ago, the famous Macedonian phalanx, solid, compact, almost irresistible, was met by the more open and more flexible Roman legion; it went down in defeat. Why? Because the legion was an organization in which the individual counted. *So must the well-disciplined, compactly organized, autocratically directed German organization yield to a new America, democratic yet united, possessing social solidarity which is built upon personal freedom and voluntary coöperation.*

LOYALTY

We are already finding on every side evidences of this new democracy, for we are beginning to develop a new kind of unity and loyalty. A year ago many people were asking the questions: "Why are we in the war?" and "What is this all about?" To-day we never hear these queries. One of the first and greatest problems of many conscientious people arises in connection with *the limits of free speech. To what extent must we make our opinions and judgments conform to those of the majority?* A large number of people find themselves, in conversation with their fellows, wondering just how far loyalty to the government demands their unqualified support in thought and in word of the attitude expressed by our officials and of actions taken by those in authority. We have been accustomed for so many generations to look upon any limitation of free speech as an act of tyranny that we hesitate to limit in any real way the expression of our thoughts. We have come to look upon individual liberty as the most important characteristic of democratic government. We have undergone many hardships, and we have accepted a great degree of inefficiency in our governments rather than permit ourselves to interfere with what we believe to be personal liberty. Yet we find that in recent years, before the war broke out, a great many laws had been passed which limited the right and liberties of the individual. In order to protect ourselves as a society, or in order to protect those members of society who were not in a position to protect themselves properly, we enacted many such laws. Some of them dealt with child labor; these kept parents from securing wages through the work of little children. Some of them were concerned with woman's work; and those interfered with the right of a woman to work eleven or twelve hours a day for a mere pittance. Some of them provided for workmen's compensation; and those were declared unconstitutional at first, because they took from an employer his property without his own consent.

We are beginning to develop a new method of handling many problems in order to protect SOCIETY, even if it interferes with the "rights" of some individual, so we therefore believe that freedom of speech

and of the press must not injure society simply for the purpose of giving an individual full expression of his opinions or prejudices. We are agreed that the conduct of the war by *the American people* must not be obstructed by personal preferences, by individual objections to the methods used for securing troops or raising money, by personal desire for peace or for a different conduct of military or other necessary activities. This does not mean that we as individuals must deny ourselves the right to have our own opinions, but it does mean that, if the expression of those opinions interferes with the work of the American people in the conduct of the war, we must either be willing to suppress our criticisms or accept the punishment which the public thinks just — a punishment which is in proportion to the injury which, in the opinion of those in authority, our words or acts have done. If we cannot or will not coöperate to that extent, we shall not only fail to win, but we shall seem to prove that democracy breaks down in crises. Are we willing to pay that price for "individual liberty"?

That we must yield to the public good, therefore, in a time like the present, our own opinions, and therefore some part of our liberty of conscience or of speech, scarcely permits of discussion. *If several millions of our young men are willing to sacrifice their lives for America, we can at least give them an undivided and unquestioned support.* Until those in authority have acted, we can help by suggestion and criticism, as well as in other ways. When a law has been passed or a work has been begun, we can help carry it through until something better can be found, possibly by keeping quiet if we preferred something different. All the world hates a destructive critic and a knocker — then why be one?

In no other way can America gain that unity, that enthusiasm, that solidarity without which not only the war, but America herself, must fail. If we would defeat Germany, we must beat her. When we look across to Germany and see a nation half-starved, yet still united, still loyal to her rulers, still unbroken, we wonder, and our wonder is only dulled, not destroyed, by the knowledge that the German who protests, the German who quits, the German who rebels, probably loses his liberty, or is "shot at sunrise." We certainly shall not allow them to excel us in loyalty; then think

of how loyal we shall be, not because we must, but because we will it so.

COÖPERATION

Without loyalty, coöperation is impossible. Without intelligent support and cheerful sacrifice, coöperation is fruitless. We cannot all do the same things, nor is it necessary or advisable that all should try to do the same. No war is won absolutely by the soldiers in the trenches, although they bear the brunt of the fighting and must make the heaviest personal sacrifices, since they place their lives at the disposal of their countrymen. A large number, taken almost exclusively from the sturdy, earnest, able-bodied men of America, can and must be ready to coöperate by making up *the fighting force of the American nation*. Besides those soldiers and sailors who are in the thick of the conflict, there are almost as many connected with the military or naval service, or with the munitions or commissary department, whose work is just as indispensable for success on the field of battle, most of whom never get within the roar of guns at the front. There are other millions only indirectly connected with the fighting forces who are not yet organized under the government for the purpose of carrying on the regular or special work connected with the war. All workers, even though they may not be directly connected with the war, can help by doing their work better than it has ever been done before.

Almost as essential is the coöperation of *those in necessary industries*, unconnected, at least at the present time, with the military or naval forces of the United States or with any of our government agencies. The value of the tasks performed by these men is shown by the fact that those who do not go into the army are placed in essential industries; theoretically at least all men between eighteen and forty-five must "work or fight." So vital to the successful conduct of the war is the work of the men employed in transportation and coal mining that early in the war our government established control over the operation of all interstate railways and it has been proposed that the government should either supervise carefully or should take over the coal mines. Of course it would be

impossible for the government to try to manage all the farms in addition, but it is not impossible for the government to supervise and direct the work of the farmers, without whose coöperation, the war will fail because necessary foods are not produced.

To the rest of the adult Americans direct coöperation in action or in production is not easily possible. The most direct way in which these men and the women and children can help is, first, by doing the necessary duties belonging to each one and doing them well — if possible, doing them better than any one else could have done them. If we are patriotic, we can have no option in this matter. Is there any reason why one man between eighteen and forty-five should give up everything to “make the world safe for democracy” and another, because he has dependents, should be free to do anything that he pleases? Is there any reason why a man under forty-six should be asked to place his life and his time at the absolute disposal of our government and another over forty-five should be under no obligation, financial or personal, to help in any way that he can or in any way he is needed? *Is there any reason why a man of any age should sacrifice more than a woman, a boy, or a girl? Is America the homeland only of the man in uniform; or is she our country, dear to every one of us?* We may not be called for service abroad, but do we ask for exemption, on the ground of age, from *our* duty to the nation? If “work or fight” is a good rule for some, why not for all? As President Wilson said when our first selective service law was passed, “The nation needs all men; but it needs each man, not in the field that will most pleasure him, but in the endeavor that will best serve the common good.” The second way in which every one can help is by carrying out in spirit and in detail the suggestions and directions of the President or of the national and local food commissioners and of others whose business it is to organize, to save, and to help. *A far larger number of persons can coöperate in the saving of food than can help in almost any other direct way*, although by economy, by the cheerful paying of burdensome taxes, and by loans to the government at real sacrifices, every one of us can help.

ECONOMY AND EFFICIENCY

Coöperation must be positive to a certain extent, but, for the larger number of people, it is likely to be negative. We may not be able to fight at the front or to serve as government employees or even to grow wheat or turn out some other product necessary for the conduct of the war. We may, nevertheless, be able to help very effectively by practicing some highly valuable economies. As has already been suggested, even if we cannot produce food, we can save it for Europe. Under the guidance of Mr. Hoover and his able assistants in Washington and in the different states, a very large percentage of housekeepers have agreed to coöperate by following out general suggestions and by observing the special days and regulations which the Food Commission has emphasized. The amount that has been saved already through meatless and wheatless days shows that the American people are perfectly willing to save for the benefit of the boys at the front or for the starving civilians in northern France or Belgium. They have proved in addition, what is even more important, *that they will co-operate and save voluntarily, an operation and a process which proves that Americans will find better ways than the Germans use for winning the war.* We must not expect, of course, that volunteer methods alone will be sufficient in solving the problems of real crises, but there can be no question that the success of the food commission in securing the hearty support of all classes augurs well for ultimate victory.

In Europe, and in America before the Civil War, economy has consisted chiefly of scrimping and saving; we call that *thrift*. In the United States during the last half century, economy has been used in a rather different sense. If a man found that his income was less than his expenditures, instead of reducing his expenses, he went out after more business, or he tried to make his plant or store or farm more productive. True economy combines some elements of both of these methods. It involves the elimination of wastes, provided that means real saving, but it places special emphasis, not upon limiting the materials needed for the production of some product, but *the best possible use of those*

materials, for that, after all, is true economy. In the present war crisis we are confronted with the double problem of war economics. In general, we must make everything count. *If we are producing goods,* we must see that the product pays us for the effort made as well as the materials used. *In the consumption of goods,* we must moreover practice the old-type economy. We are confronted with this situation: there is not enough wheat or meat or other nutritious foods suitable for transportation to Europe to supply both our allies and ourselves, *if* we consume as much of those commodities as we have in the past. Since transportation facilities must be used first and to a large extent for carrying those things most essential in the conduct of the war, we may be obliged to go without, or limit the use of, such articles as coal, which are brought to our particular community from a distance. We can see from this brief survey that economy requires knowledge and mutual helpfulness as well as a willingness to make sacrifices.

Comprehension, loyalty, coöperation, and economy must go together; taken together they spell efficiency. It does not matter how much we know, if we can make no use of it. It is highly desirable that people should be good and honest and true; but if they stop there, mankind has not made the progress that it should. If we help one another constantly and persistently, the value of this coöperation will depend upon whether it is intelligent, but it will depend far more on whether we are efficient. Efficiency then is to a certain extent the goal toward which we are striving, but it is a means rather than an end; for efficiency such as Prussianism produces, which is willing to sacrifice self-respect, life, and honor, costs too much. Efficiency is at once the easiest and the most difficult thing in the world to obtain. It is the easiest, because, when one knows how to do a thing, the sacrifice and the cost which the doing represents are almost negligible. The expert, whether a teacher or a scientist, a statesman or an engineer, reaches in a few seconds a decision which is impossible for the ignoramus or the novice. It is the most difficult because most experts have become proficient through long years of discipline and endeavor. He spoke truly who said that nine-tenths of genius is capacity for hard work.

Sometimes efficiency depends far more on enthusiasm and earnest-

ness than it does on any other qualities. The citizen armies of the first French Republic, inspired by Carnot, "Organizer of Victory," were more than a match for the ablest veterans of their enemies, by whom they were far outnumbered. With the patriotism aroused against Germany, the British workman found that he could speed up his work and produce without difficulty, although at some extra cost to muscle, nerve, and brain, five times as large a daily product as he had turned out in a day before the war began.

Real efficiency must combine a large number of qualities: knowledge, skill, experience, persistence, and endurance. He who lacks one of these qualities will find himself to that degree less efficient than his fellows; but he who combines them all and uses them with the same unselfishness and enthusiasm as the soldier who, inspired by his love of country, has offered his life for her sake, will have proved himself worthy of the highest place on our nation's roll of honor.

HOW WE MUST DEFEAT GERMANY. A SUMMARY

We are not only in the war, but as Congress declared in its first war resolution, we are in the war with all our resources to fight to a finish. Even yet our allies across the water may not have found the best ways of coöperating with one another. Unable to use all of their own resources to the best possible advantage, they are looking to us, first, for foodstuffs, secondly, for financial support, thirdly, for military help, and last, but not least, for a combined effort which will end the war. *So long as the war lasts, our problem is to turn a people who have opposed militarism, and whose thought and ways are the thoughts and ways of peace, into an efficient fighting unit.* It may be impossible that we should create, in a month or a year or even a decade, a fighting *machine* such as the Germans have to-day, for they have back of them centuries of militarism made effective by fifty years of active preparation, a political and national organization particularly adapted to carrying on war, a spirit of discipline and of subservience among the people which makes for military success. That need not trouble us, for our Sammies have already shown that whatever we lack in effective, autocratic organization, at least on the battlefield we far more than make

up in enthusiasm, in determination, and in intelligent, voluntary coöperation. We do not want, and we are not willing to use, the iron discipline which is the foundation of German unity. We will sacrifice almost anything rather than give up that spirit of freedom which is almost unknown in Germany. We must, therefore, expect to win, at home or abroad, and beat the Germans at their own game, not by aping their methods, but by devising something better. When we think how much the Germans owe to American inventions which they have perfected, as for example, the airplane and the submarine, we must be ready not only to invent other engines of destructiveness or of helpfulness which are even more valuable, but we must develop and perfect them, we must make them far more efficient than any Prussian substitutes. In short, we must develop those qualities which are distinctively American; those qualities which have already made this nation great in other channels than those of war. By the use of Yankee ingenuity, of Southern dash, and of Western grit, combined with American versatility and resourcefulness, we shall see this crisis through to a successful conclusion.

QUESTIONS

1. What did President Wilson mean when he said that it is a nation rather than an army which we must train for war? Name some of the ways in which the nation has already been prepared for its share of its great conflict.

2. Can you name any problem which you can solve without knowing anything about the problem itself or the best ways of solving such problems? Why should all political and educational leaders urge students to remain in school as long as possible? Why are special exemptions and privileges granted to high school graduates in the new army, and why will special privileges and opportunities be granted to our youngest soldiers after the War?

3. Show that we must understand Prussianism and the German problem as well as modern European history and the general European problem. Explain why we must understand American needs and particularly those of our schools better than we need understand any European conditions.

4. If the right of an individual conflicts with the right of a group

of which that individual is a member, which right must yield and which survive? Is there any good reason why, especially in war, an individual should not be loyal enough to give up, for the welfare of the nation, any right which he has in time of peace?

5. Explain why "without loyalty coöperation is impossible; without intelligent support and cheerful sacrifice, coöperation is fruitless." If certain men between eighteen and forty-five are drafted, what are the obligations of the men of those ages who are exempted? What is meant by the expression "work or fight"? Is a man over forty-five, a boy under eighteen, or any woman or girl free to say that because he or she is not drafted he or she has no obligations to his country? In other words, if we are not called upon to give all, is there any reason why we should not be called upon to give what we can? Are there any "essential industries" for others than men of draft age? Does the government or a worker decide what are "essential industries"? Should the school authorities and the heads of families or the boys and girls decide what are "essential tasks" for us?

6. If a nation has earned sixty billion dollars a year net, out of which it has saved twelve billion dollars, how much economy is probably necessary to pay eight billions in national taxes and sixteen billions in war loans out of a smaller income than it had originally?

7. Name an ignorant person who is highly efficient. Name a wasteful man or woman whose efficiency would not be increased by reducing waste. Show what part is played in efficiency by: (a) knowledge, (b) skill, (c) experience, (d) persistence, and (e) endurance.

8. Show what qualities of the French have been most helpful in defeating the Germans. What American qualities have been particularly valuable from the military point of view? In the larger problem of training the nation to defeat Germany, what are some of the important things that you and I can do?

II. FINANCE, FOOD, AND CLOTHING

5. HELPING UNCLE SAM FINANCE THE WAR

IN a crisis for which five million American men have already offered their lives for their country, Uncle Sam is calling upon the rest of us for our dollars. If these men do not fail him when he calls, if they are giving up home, business, comforts, and personal associates, we can at least do something to help them make good in their fight with Prussian autocracy. Even from the financial point of view, those men have made sacrifices far greater than we shall be called upon to do; because men who have been earning seventy-five, one hundred, one hundred and fifty dollars a month, and possibly much more, are now enrolled in the army at a monthly wage of \$33. Even if we take only money into account, think at how great a financial loss to themselves these fine strong citizens of ours have put on the uniform of the American soldier. Besides these men who are offering their lives, in addition to making sacrifices, there are hundreds of thousands of others, connected with the government at Washington and throughout the states, devoting most of their energy to war work, as members of important councils, food administrators, or farm advisers. Moreover, hundreds of thousands of earnest Red Cross assistants, Y. M. C. A. workers, and helpers in scores of other unofficial war organizations are giving all or a considerable part of their time in order that Germany shall not rule the world.

THE COST OF THE WAR

Our savings are needed because *never before in the history of the world has any war caused such wholesale destruction of wealth, or called for such heavy taxes or vast loans.* How many of us have any idea of how much it costs to finance a war? Even if we quote

figures, they are apt to mean very little, because a billion dollars cannot be compared very easily with a million dollars, although a billion when written looks a little like a million because it has only three ciphers more. If we were to take two million silver dollars and lay them side by side in a line, they would reach from Boston to Providence. A billion dollars would stretch five hundred times as far; it would give us a row completely encircling the globe, with enough left over to reach from New York to San Francisco. At the present time, the war is costing \$200,000,000 every day. Our line of dollars for a single twenty-four hours would reach from San Francisco to New York and from New York down to New Orleans. From the beginning of the war to January 1, 1918, the cost to all warring countries was estimated at 130 billions of dollars.¹ Before it is over, it will probably be at least as much more.

Unfortunately these vast sums are not being used as an investment, nor are they capital employed to produce more wealth. Not only is the wealth itself destroyed in explosives, munitions, and food for non-producers, but it is used to destroy lives and property in addition. It is now over three years and a half since the war started. During that time there have been millions of lives lost, many more millions of bodies bruised and crippled, and untold billions of damage done within the war area to forests, farms, villages, and cities. The loss of ships alone since the war began amounts to more than 10,000,000 tons. This takes no account whatever of the cargoes of these ships which were sunk, and most of them were heavily laden. These are only a very few of the indirect losses of war. They are not necessarily reckoned in the tables of statistics in which we add up the "costs." The costs include only those direct money expenditures made by the warring

¹ United States	\$6,700,000,000
Great Britain	26,250,000,000
France	19,600,000,000
Russia	17,700,000,000
Italy	5,850,000,000
Other Entente Allies	11,350,000,000
United States and Entente Allies	\$87,450,000,000
Germany and her Allies	40,150,000,000
Total, all warring countries	\$127,600,000,000

peoples for food, for equipment, for cannon, for rifles, for munitions,¹ or for a thousand other necessary war commodities. *How are these enormous costs paid? In one of three ways: by TAXES, by LOANS of money made to the government which is making the expenditures, or by MONEY SUBSIDIES, for example, a transfer of money funds from the United States to France.*

In order to make a little clearer both the terrible costs of war and the need which the Allies have of our money subsidies, let us take the case of France. The French have been, in recent times, one of the most industrious and thrifty of all peoples. We have been misled into thinking that all Frenchmen were like the gay Parisian of the Paris boulevards, but they are, on the contrary, light-hearted, hard-working, thrifty, and trustworthy. *The French nation has done the most real saving of any people of modern times.* Their wealth before the Great War was estimated at a little more than \$50,000,000,000, yet the French people, mostly the common people, had loaned to foreign governments, or had invested outside of France, a sum equal to about one fifth of that amount. Most of this had been saved within the preceding half century, a franc to-day, two francs to-morrow, or possibly only a few sous (fractions of cents) at a time. You wonder possibly how much of those savings, made at such great sacrifice, the French have been compelled to use during the last four years. The answer is a sad one, and it ought to make us willing, nay anxious and determined, to help. In the first two years France, which has borne the brunt of the fighting on the Western Front, where the war will be decided, laid on the altar of Mars, as a sacrifice which was wholly destroyed, a greater amount of wealth than the whole thrifty French nation had been able to save since 1850. For a period of the war to the first of January, 1918, they had used an amount equal to two-fifths of their total wealth before 1914 in order that their country might not be a victim of Prussianism. *If the war should continue for two years more, the French nation, which has been fighting the battles of civilization, your battles and mine, France, which has furnished the brainy, well-trained, experienced military*

¹ A single shot from one of the largest guns sometimes costs a thousand dollars.

leaders, will be almost hopelessly bankrupt, unless we come to her help. Does she or does she not need our pennies and our nickels? She does not beg for gifts, but she asks for loans. Remembering that during the Revolutionary War, when we needed help, France was our first friend, can there be any doubt as to our answer? Hats off to France and the French! But cheers will not win; give all you can and then start again. Give till it hurts.

At the beginning of the Great War the total wealth of the United States was about four times that of France at that time. During the three years which elapsed before we entered the great conflict, while France was spending a third of all she had, the United States added nearly a fifth to what she possessed in 1914. We may now estimate the wealth of the American people at \$250,000,000,000. If we were to spend as large a proportion of that as the French people have already given from their smaller supply, how much would we have given or loaned? A sum close to a hundred billion dollars. Even then, we should have left an amount three times as great as the wealth of France before the war began, and a larger amount for each person — man, woman, and child — in the United States, than the French people had before the war broke out. Shall we hesitate to loan to the French again and again from our abundance?

WAR TAXATION

In all great wars it is absolutely necessary that taxes shall be increased very greatly. In the wars against Napoleon, which consumed approximately one-third of the total wealth of the British Isles, it is estimated that 40 per cent of the expenditures were met through the levying of taxes, which in some cases were quite heavy, upon a very large number of articles and incomes. During our own Civil War there were taxes upon imports and upon practically all manufactured articles. In some cases taxes were levied at several different stages in the manufacture of the same article. There were also at that time income taxes levied upon all incomes equal to about \$250 in gold. The rates on larger incomes were not so high then as now, chiefly because very large incomes in those days were practically unknown. Since our government

wishes twenty-four billion dollars for the fiscal year 1918-1919, Congress has just passed an eight billion dollar revenue act.

The Allies in Europe are now depending to a considerable extent upon taxation. *The British income tax*, for example, is levied upon a majority of the earners of the United Kingdom. Only those are exempted from taxation whose yearly incomes are less than £130 (\$650), and those with an income of £1000 (\$5000) a year pay £150 (\$750) to the government. Upon an income of £50,000 (about \$245,000), the rate is 50 per cent of the whole income. In France and in Italy the taxes are very heavy indeed. In Germany the government does not stop with the levying of taxes; it makes every one work hard at some task which it prescribes and it takes most of what he or she produces for military needs.

Before the war we had a low income tax which exempted persons with incomes of less than three or four thousand dollars a year. One of the first important measures passed by Congress after the war broke out was a War Revenue Act, which made the income tax apply to incomes of \$2000 for married men and to incomes of \$1000 for single persons. This tax was changed in 1918, and rates were raised still higher. For the first \$4000 of taxable income the rate of the *regular tax* is six per cent, above that it is twelve per cent. In addition there are *surtaxes* on all large incomes. The rates on incomes of more than a million dollars a year are so high that the multimillionaire gives Uncle Sam practically three-fourths of his income. At the same time the government has appropriated part of the huge profits of war industries and profiteers. In 1917 there was an excess profits tax that reached all profits in excess of fifteen per cent on the capital stock; in 1918 the rates were raised on this tax also. Even if we are not affected by those laws, *we are helping in the payment of taxes* whenever we pay three-cents postage on a letter or two cents for a postal card and when we purchase any article taxed by the government.

LOANS AND THRIFT STAMPS

As it is not possible for any people to pay all of the expenses of a great war while the war is being fought, it is necessary to borrow

immense sums of money. Most of it is borrowed in large amounts. The lenders give the national government their dollars, and in return they receive finely printed documents called *bonds*. These bonds are a promise of the United States Government to the lender that at the end of thirty years, or possibly sooner, it will repay the amount named on the face of the bond, and that every six months it will pay him interest at the rate of four or four and one-fourth per cent on the sum loaned.

When we *pay taxes*, we are giving from our wealth to help win the war; and it is right and proper that we should be forced to give liberally, for if Germany had carried out her scheme to dominate the world, we should have had very much less wealth than we shall have after paying the heaviest possible war taxes. But *when we buy bonds we are not giving, we are INVESTING*. We shall get back all that we put in, and in addition twice a year we get interest on our investment. A good investor looks first at the security, then at the rate of interest. Uncle Sam gives the best security in the world, for the wealth at his command has many times the total value of his debts, and he gives us good interest. Simply to buy bonds is a matter of business, not of patriotism. Where then does the patriotism come in? In the sacrifices, the savings, to get the *extra* amount that Uncle Sam needs.

For the ten years before we came into the Great War, the American people were *saving* one dollar out of every five that they earned. No people had ever saved so large a percentage of their income before; but we did it easily because no other people had ever had so large an income per person. However, we did not practice thrift; we were wasteful. We bought far more clothing than we required, we wasted a third of the food that we purchased, and we bought millions of articles that we did not need. The war came — millions of workers have been taken out of productive industry and placed in war work. We are therefore producing less wealth than we did a few years ago; and, whereas three years ago we spent very little on our army and navy, *this year we must raise twenty-four billions of dollars for war expenses, eight billions through taxes and sixteen billions through loans. There is only one way that it can be done, and that is by SAVING NEARLY TWICE AS*

MUCH AS WE DID THREE YEARS AGO.¹ For every five dollars that is earned at least two must be saved. That is the reason that we hear so much about *thrift*, more THRIFT, and still more THRIFT. The war cannot be won without far more thrift than we ever dreamed of before April, 1917. Save food, not simply because our men in Europe need it, but because food-waste helps the Kaiser. Buy fewer *new* clothes, and new silk stockings, and new ribbons, because we must conserve supplies of clothing materials, and unnecessary expenditure is pro-German. Don't buy candy or chewing gum, go only a quarter as often to the movies, cut out all luxuries because thrift and thrift only will make it possible for us to let Uncle Sam have all the money he needs — not wants, but needs. He must have it. Otherwise our boys may go cold or hungry;² otherwise there won't be enough rifles and machine guns, enough bullets and shells, to defeat the Huns. For most of us patriotism and thrift are much the same. How much have you saved? How much can you save? How much will you save?

When making a loan to the general public the government offers Liberty Bonds, for which every man, woman, and child should subscribe to the full extent of his ability to purchase. It is an interesting and surprising fact that, *not only in this country, but in Europe, each successive loan seems to reach a larger number of investors and to produce a greater sum of money than the loan preceding.*³ In order that those of us who cannot afford to buy bonds shall have a chance to help, Uncle Sam has brought out *Thrift Certificates* (W. S. S.), which at the end of five years will be worth five dollars. This month (October) these cost about \$4.21, and they will cost a little more each month until the five dollars is to

¹ Of course, some people must use their capital for bonds and stamps.

² Ten cents a day will keep a Belgian or French child from starving. When we are not saving for Uncle Sam, let's save for boys and girls and babies who have lost their homes in the war area.

³ The first Liberty Loan was for two billion dollars at 3½ per cent, but the interest was exempt from taxation and the surtaxes or extra rates of the income tax of 1917. The second Liberty Loan was for three billion dollars at 4 per cent, but provided that if more than three billion dollars was offered, one-half of the excess above three billion should be taken. This loan produced, therefore, about \$3,792,000,000. The third loan produced still more and the fourth is for six billions.

be paid. He is also issuing *Thrift Stamps* worth twenty-five cents each. With the stamps and the certificates he is furnishing cards on which the stamps can be pasted as we buy them. When we have filled our card with Thrift Stamps, we can trade it, with a small sum of money, for a Thrift Certificate, which on January 1, 1923, will be worth the five-dollar face value. These Thrift Certificates we can paste on our cards, adding others as we find the time to earn extra money. Since some of us cannot save as much as twenty-five cents at one time, some banks are issuing scrip stamps which we can also paste on cards and later exchange for the Thrift Stamps. If we do these things, we are helping win the war; but we must remember that we are not *giving* these sums to Uncle Sam, because in the future we shall get back in actual cash more than we have loaned. We will get something infinitely more valuable to us — the feeling that we are a part of this great conflict, that we are doing our share, that if any trouble comes from lack of funds, we have at least done what we could to ward off the difficulty, because we have saved, possibly at a great sacrifice to ourselves. *Isn't it worth while to think that we and Uncle Sam are partners in this tremendously important business of winning a war? And a war to protect civilization!*

Some of us are inclined perhaps to think, "What little I can do does not matter." Let us stop and think again. If it were possible for every pupil in the United States to save 5 cents a day, how much would be saved in a month? Thirty million dollars! In a year we would have twelve times that sum, or as much as it cost Uncle Sam to run the national government twenty-five years ago. We should save a little every day if possible, and in whatever ways we can. Instead of buying a piece of candy or a package of chewing gum, we can save that money toward a thrift stamp. One boy or girl working alone cannot save very much, but if twenty million others are doing the same thing, it means that the school children of America are becoming capitalists, and capitalists in the best cause possible — helping to fight for their country.

REFERENCES

McAdoo, *The Liberty Loan*.

National War Savings Committee, *United States Government War Savings Stamps*.

The Liberty Loan of 1917 — Campaign Textbook.

The Liberty Loan of 1917 — A Source Book.

National City Bank, New York, *Bulletins*.

What the War Costs, "Literary Digest," Jan. 26, 1918, 72-78.

QUESTIONS

1. Give some idea of the cost of the war. How does the cost to the Allies compare with that to Germany and her allies? Why will long-continued expenditure of wealth by the French be disastrous to that people? If we should take over the whole debt that France has incurred since the beginning of the war, how much additional sacrifice would it make for us?

2. If a man who has been earning a hundred dollars a month serves Uncle Sam for thirty-three dollars, how much of a financial sacrifice does he make every day? Would we not think we were doing wonderfully well, *on the same business income*, to buy three fifty dollar bonds a year? Would that be anything like our share compared with the sacrifices made by the soldier?

3. What percentage of the cost of the war does our government plan to pay through the levying of taxes? Upon which taxes or what kinds of taxes is chief dependence placed by our government? Name some ways in which school boys and girls help Uncle Sam by the paying of taxes.

4. If possible, give some idea of the differences in income taxes paid by a man with an *income* of ten thousand dollars a year: (a) before the war, (b) under the law of 1916, (c) under the law of 1917, (d) under the law of 1918, (e) in Great Britain.

5. How many Liberty loans have already been issued? The most recent loan was for what sum? What rate of interest did the bonds bear and for how long a time were they issued? What sum of money was raised by the sale of these bonds?

6. What is a thrift stamp? What is a thrift certificate? What do the letters W. S. S. mean? Since the thrift stamps accumulate compound interest, are they not an excellent investment for big as well as little investors? Is it not an advantage to Uncle Sam that he need not pay out interest on them until 1923?

6. THE CLOTHING PROBLEM AND THE WAR

SINCE the beginning of the war in 1914 the world's yearly supply of raw materials and manufactured products has been used with great rapidity. At the same time the production of raw materials has continuously decreased. The world now faces a shortage in many of the necessities of life, most notably a lack of food and clothing materials.

ELEMENTS OF THE FOOD AND CLOTHING PROBLEMS

Before taking up the study of the different commodities, let us consider for a moment some elements of the problem. (1) The first is *the extraordinary food and clothing NEEDS arising out of the war*. Every day, particularly on the West Front, there is destruction of millions of dollars' worth of wealth, and there is the constant use by soldiers at high pressure of hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of other forms of goods. A soldier needs very much more warm clothing and much heavier blankets than does the ordinary citizen, living a sheltered life in a home. Because he lives under a strain, and works hard, he needs unusually nutritious foods, such as wheat and animal fats. It is therefore necessary, if he is to be kept fit, that he should be supplied with all things necessary to make him as highly efficient as possible. (2) In the second place, *the war zone cannot produce any of the articles needed by the troops. These must be brought from a distance. They must therefore be of a TRANSPORTABLE NATURE*. If a choice must be made between two things, one of which can be transported easily, and another which is bulky and expensive for carrying, then we must select the one which can be carried with least trouble and at the lowest cost. If we are dealing with foods, we must save for the troops in Europe those meats and cereals which can be transported without spoiling and which possess a very large amount of nourish-

ment compared with their bulk. Four types of foods are particularly usable in these ways — first, beef; second, pork and animal fats; third, wheat; and fourth, sugar. (3) We must take into account the fact that, because half of the able-bodied men of the warring countries have been taken away from their regular occupations, *there is a SHORTAGE in almost all goods, including foods, produced in Europe.* To be sure the women of these nations have done the very best they could to make up the difference, but they have been obliged to add this work to their own, and therefore could not do both as well as they were done before the war. (4) On account of unfavorable weather, the lack of fertilizer nitrates (which have been used for explosives), and destructive plant diseases, especially in the cotton and wheat areas, *the United States has had SMALL CROPS* of some of our most important staple products. For example, for two years our wheat production was not more than four-fifths of the normal. (5) During the last two years, the world's tonnage of merchant ships has decreased constantly, because of destruction in war and particularly by the use of the submarine within the war zones. Since the demand for ships is greater than usual, and the supply of vessels is below normal, it is necessary to use all merchant ships on the shortest routes possible; they cannot be spared for long voyages simply because they have no time for long trips. On this account, *our European allies and the neutral nations of Europe have been obliged to depend largely upon their own continent and NORTH AMERICA for their supply of meat, wheat, sugar, wool, and those other things necessary for the conduct of the war, and for keeping the allied troops in good condition.* (6) Another element of the war problem is *the extraordinary RISE OF PRICES* since 1914. The dollar of that year is now worth only about 50 cents when it is used in buying the necessities of life.¹

¹ The problem of the rise of prices due to the depreciation of the dollar is one of the most important that our national government has to face. As it is one of extraordinary difficulty, little has been attempted yet. In America prices of certain commodities, notably foodstuffs and wool, have risen more than most other prices. This has been due to unusual scarcity of those commodities. Prices on the continent of Europe are very high indeed compared with pre-war prices. The

It can be seen from this brief summary of conditions that if only certain commodities can be used by the troops at the front, and if those commodities are very scarce in quantity and high in price both in Europe and America, and the total supply of them must be secured in America to make up the deficiency in Europe, there cannot be a very large amount left in America for those of us who stay at home. It naturally follows that we must either find substitutes or we must go without. Since it is possible in almost all cases to find substitutes which are fairly satisfactory for us, but which cannot be transported long distances, *patriotism requires that we use these substitutes* in order that our own boys in Europe, and the allied troops that are fighting our battles for us, shall not be forced to go without the food and clothing which they need.

THE SHORTAGE OF COTTON AND WOOL

The two fabrics most used for clothing are cotton and wool. They are the staples for clothing, and under ordinary conditions there would be enough to supply the market at home as well as abroad, but the conditions mentioned above that hamper production have had their effect in America. *The American COTTON CROP for the year 1917 was the third poor crop in succession*, and it was the poorest of the three, so poor in fact that, with the drought in August, 1918, and another short crop this year, a world famine in cotton is probable. Although nearly fifteen million bales of cotton were produced in 1914, four years later the crop totaled less than eleven million bales. After the war broke out, our exports of cotton to Europe fell off greatly and therefore less land was planted to that crop. Later, the demand and the acreage came back to the average; but the lack of fertilizer, particularly of potash due to the blockade of Germany, and shortage of labor in the South caused by the migration of negroes to northern industrial centers, added to bad weather conditions and plant diseases, have made it impossible to raise a normal supply.

chief cause of this is the scarcity of necessities in those countries, but general high prices in France and Germany have been due also to the issue of \$5,000,000,000 of bank notes in the first country, and four-fifths as much in the second.

On the other hand *the demand for cotton is greater than ever before*. It is used in the manufacture of explosives. It is used to a greater extent than formerly in cloth because of the shortage of wool. With a *reduced supply* of cotton and an *increased demand* for it, the United States must find ways (1) to increase the supply of cotton that is raised, and (2) to conserve it in every possible way so that it will be available for the most important uses. The success of the second means of increasing the supply of cotton will depend upon the coöperation of the people of America, and every man, woman and child should be enlisted in this conservation project.

The world's supply of wool since the outbreak of the Great War has been reduced by conditions somewhat similar to those which have limited the world's supply of cotton. Within the war belt in Europe the number of sheep has been reduced to less than one-third what it was before 1914. This is, of course, the result of several causes, among which are the lack of proper pasturage for the sheep, the constant demand for food, including mutton, and the failure of the people to take proper care of their flocks because the men were at the front. The supply of wool in the United States has also decreased considerably. The number of American sheep in 1910 was 57,500,000, but in 1916 it was estimated to be less than 49,000,000. The amount of wool produced fell from 328,000,000 pounds in 1910 to 288,000,000 in 1916, and in spite of all precautions, it is being reduced somewhat every year. In the three years preceding the entrance of the United States into the war, we imported for our own use very much larger quantities of foreign wools than we had formerly imported. We cannot continue to do this (1) because the world's supply of wool outside of the United States is considerably less to-day than it was before 1914, and (2) because ships can no longer be spared to bring even wool and wheat from Australia to either America or Europe.¹

¹ First of all, *Australia* has not enough ships to continue her trade even with the mother country. Secondly, even if Australia were able to ship us consignments of wool, the country must comply with England's demand that all wool grown and worn in the British Empire be conserved for England and her allies. The other great source is *South America*. The amount we can get there is not large enough,

Experts estimate that we shall need 900,000,000 pounds of wool for the fighting forces of America. That will leave none at all for the rest of us.

What was said about the *increased demand* for cotton is true of wool, but in greater degree. Although wool is not used, as is cotton, in the making of explosives, the soldier requires very much more for his clothing and his protection at night than the civilian in a heated house not exposed to the rigors of outdoor weather. *The amount of wool material needed for a military outfit is greater than that for a civilian.* Moreover, soldiers' clothing has to be renewed at shorter intervals than civilians'. If the soldier is to be kept warm and dry and provided with all the uniforms, overcoats, and blankets which he will need (even if we do not count sweaters, socks, and wristlets), then we must be prepared to let him have at least three times as much wool as he would have needed before he entered the army, and five times as much as you or I ought to ask to have saved for us.

Government authorities have tried time and again to induce the farmers to raise more wool, but without the desired results. An unusually severe winter with many sharp changes of weather caused heavy losses among the herds and also affected the quality of wool for 1917. Feed has been high-priced and the temptation to reduce the flocks has consequently been great. Demand for meat has been so constant that many sheep have gone upon the market. Because of the migration of people to the West to settle upon public land, the sheep herders have been forced back from thousands of acres of government land which they formerly used for grazing.

however, to supply our present needs. The clothing of the army is the great problem to-day. Where formerly an American soldier wore garments that were 100 per cent wool, the country is glad enough to-day if we can furnish him with clothes that are 80 per cent pure wool. "Wool" garments, even of the immediate future, need not be "all wool"; in fact, they need not contain more than 20 per cent of wool.

The scale of prices of to-day, compared with what it was in the pre-war period, is perhaps the best way of showing how scarce the product is. Although prices in general have risen only about 80 per cent since 1914, a yard of broadcloth 54 inches wide, which formerly cost \$2.00 a yard, cannot now be bought for less than \$4.50.

CONSERVATION PROGRAM FOR HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS

The shortage of cotton and wool makes it imperative that great effort be made immediately to reduce our present consumption in order to avoid actual famine in these materials which would result in great suffering, particularly in the colder portions of the country. Because of their comparative cheapness we have been accustomed to use cotton and wool carelessly. There are more than a million and a half high school students in the United States, who, because of their growth and activity, require a supply of clothing material greater than that required by a similar number of adults. *Organized effort on the part of high school students* toward reducing the use of the present wool and cotton supply would result in a large saving of these fabrics. This is one of the high school student's best opportunities to "do his bit" for his country. Some effort has already been made. Girls in sewing classes have agreed to buy no new material for class work where suitable old material could be remade. Boys have been ready to adopt the wearing of corduroy trousers to save wool. But more definite and more earnest efforts must be made.

The first important step is to *make this year's supply of clothing, so far as possible, from old material*, thus making a smaller demand on the supply of wool and cotton for 1918. Clubs should be organized pledged to this patriotic duty. The remaking of old garments requires more forethought, knowledge, and skill than making garments from new material. Domestic art teachers and advanced domestic art students can arrange to give assistance at specified hours to those who are planning to remake old material. Valuable suggestions have been offered for using worn material to be used by these groups of students.¹ As many girls as possible should plan to serve as leaders in clothing conservation. They can prepare for the work through the courses in sewing and textiles offered in the high schools. If trade dressmaking is offered in addition, the preparation would be very satisfactory. These courses deal with the main problems of garment making, judging

¹ See page 101.

and buying materials, and selecting the style that will be suitable for the material used.

Changing style in clothing is the chief cause of waste in clothing material. During the war at least, the United States should greatly reduce this waste. High school students can help win the war by agreeing not to discard perfectly good garments in order to make use of new styles. Furthermore, if, after utilizing old material as far as possible, high school students should adopt a simple style of clothing to be in vogue as long as the war lasts, they will help to conserve our textile supplies still more. We do not need to appear shabbily dressed in order to make these savings, for we can save our better clothes for the times and places where they are most needed. However, if we replace our garments with new clothing simply because there has been a change in style, we shall use far more than our share of the supplies of cotton and wool, or of substitutes for these articles. This will raise the prices for those who must buy some extra garments. Some students can hardly afford them now, and it will cause a further shortage of war necessities for our boys in the cantonments and at the front. Can we not do at least a quarter as much as the boys and girls of Italy, France, and Great Britain?

REFERENCES

New York Times, Dec. 29, 1917, Art. *Rags*; Jan. 6, 1918, Art. *Wool and Cotton*.

Department of the Interior. Bureau of Education. *Home Economics Teaching Under Present Economic Conditions*.

QUESTIONS

1. Name and explain four elements of the food and clothing problems, and show how they affect students particularly.
2. Name some uses of cotton in time of peace and some additional uses in time of war. To what extent have we had normal crops of cotton since 1914? What were some of the war conditions which made the crop poorer than usual in the years 1915-17 inclusive; in 1918? How large was the 1918 crop, and at what price per pound is cotton selling now?

3. Why has the world supply of wool been decreasing since the beginning of the century? If the United States produced in 1918 less than three hundred million pounds of wool and imported only as much as in 1917, that is, less than four hundred million pounds, how will the army get the nine hundred million pounds that they really need for the present year? How much will be left over for the rest of us?

4. Give all the uses you can which the soldiers find for wool. Can cotton be made a better substitute or a complete substitute? Can you name any other substitute beside cotton which is being used at the present time?

5. How do prices of cotton and woolen cloth compare with those of two years ago? of five years ago? If one can afford to buy woolen goods, why may she not continue to do that so long as she has money? Why is the conservation of old clothing and dress goods possibly the most important patriotic duty for the girls to-day?

6. Give practical suggestions in regard to the saving of clothing and the making over of garments. If pressing clubs are organized in schools which have departments of domestic science, should not rooms or days be set aside for boys' clubs as well as those for girls? As a means of conserving clothing, is it not desirable to prevent competition among girls? Will not the adoption of uniforms do this?

7. THE FOOD PROBLEM

GENERAL

FEW of us know what it means to be hungry for any length of time. Practically none of us has suffered hunger for weeks and months. Yet during the last two years *there has been a shortage of food in central and eastern Europe which has amounted, in northern Russia, in parts of Austria-Hungary, and in Germany, to a condition akin to famine.* Food has been so scarce that it could not be bought at any price. In fact, in Germany, almost from the beginning of the war, there has been a lack of cereals, of animal fats and butter, and of most meats, which has forced the German government to conserve every particle of food and dole it out in small quantities only when absolutely needed. *In France and Great Britain, the food situation was not serious until the beginning of the ruthless submarine war campaign in February, 1917.* It is a well-known fact that before the war Great Britain had depended upon the outside world for the larger part of her food supply; with that supply the submarine campaign naturally interfered. In France the difficulty has been due to the fact that an enemy holds the northeastern part of the country and that about half of the men who had been engaged in farming have been forced to leave their farms in order to help repel the enemy. The food shortage in both Great Britain and France has become serious. In England, for example, wheat restrictions are more severe than they were in America, even during the summer of 1918. Sugar consumption is limited, as with us, to two pounds a month per person. No Englishman may buy more than eight ounces of bacon, or more than 42 cents' worth of fresh meat per week. Since Australia and Argentina cannot send Europe their surplus food supply because of lack of ships, it is absolutely necessary that we should export to the Allies all the food we can, and that *we should select those articles, such as beef, pork,*

animal fats, sugar, and wheat, which contain the largest amount of nourishment in small bulk, and which alone can be transported to them.

It is generally believed that it is easier to shift production than it is to influence the dietary of people; but we have been forced to follow the opposite plan because *our government can tell us we cannot eat certain foods, and it cannot compel farmers to raise the foods most needed or the exact quantities most desired.* In America our governments cannot tell farmer A to plant wheat, and farmer B to plant corn, and farmer C to raise sugar beets, and farmer D to raise beans, and farmer E to specialize on pigs, and so on, in order that we shall have enough persons at work producing the different commodities which we need as food. Since each farmer is allowed to plant what he pleases on the land which he owns or rents, *in America the government does not control food production.* We do, however, control food consumption. Early in the war Mr. Herbert Hoover was appointed national *Food Administrator*, and he is assisted by food administrators in every state, county, and city. Mr. Hoover has appealed to the patriotism of every man, woman, and child in the United States to help save those foods needed in Europe, because in that way he believes "food will win the war."

THE WORLD'S FOOD SHORTAGE

The Entente Allies have never tried to supply themselves with all of the meat that they have needed, but, before the war broke out, they did have a large number of cattle, sheep, and hogs upon which they depended in part for their supplies of food. On account of the extraordinary needs, particularly of the soldiers at the front, the temptation to kill these different animals for food has been unusual. When we add to this problem the difficulty in finding feed for the stock and the danger in some parts of the Continent from raids by the enemy, we can see why the number of sheep in the allied countries was reduced in three years by more than seventeen million, and the number of cattle and hogs by about the same number. This loss in the number of farm animals has become more and more serious, because, in spite of this decrease, more animal food was needed in 1917 than had been provided by the larger number three years earlier.

Before the war we were in the habit of sending each year to Europe about 500,000,000 pounds of animal products and fats. That was only a little more than one pound for each person living in Europe at that time, or about as much as each of us consumed in two days. We can see that our ordinary exports, therefore, would not go very far towards supplying their needs. In 1917, on the contrary, we exported more than three times as much as we had exported in 1914 — an amount which would probably give ten pounds for each inhabitant of western Europe, including the soldiers who are fighting in the trenches. But ten pounds per soldier, added to the meat supplies of the Allied countries, is not nearly enough to keep the soldier in good condition, nor are ten additional pounds per inhabitant enough to maintain a decent food standard for the people who are not actually engaged in war. *We must, therefore, if possible, increase greatly the amount of meat which is sent abroad. How are we going to do it? In one of two ways: first, we must raise more animals; and, secondly, we must eat less meat than we have done.*

The wheat situation has been even more serious than the meat problem. Although before the war France grew practically all of the wheat which she needed, no other country of Western Europe produced enough wheat for its use. Because of the war conditions, which have taken men to the front and have left many farms and many acres on other farms absolutely uncultivated, or cultivated under unfavorable conditions without proper tillage and fertilizer, the wheat supply of Western Europe is less than two-thirds the amount which it would be in ordinary times. Before 1914 Great Britain alone annually imported 221,000,000 bushels of wheat, and all other European countries (not counting territory now controlled by Germany) imported 305,000,000 bushels in addition. This year, therefore, the Allies must import enough to make up their own shortage, plus an amount equal to the supply regularly imported before the war broke out, plus a supply necessary because of special war needs. Even with continual saving in the warring countries, the total wheat needed for a single year amounts to at least 500,000,000 bushels for the Entente Allies, without counting neutrals.

The problem of wheat may be taken to illustrate the problem of

other crops, for example, *sugar beets*. Before the Great War the world's annual output of sugar was about twenty million tons, a little more than half of which was cane sugar raised in the tropics. The rest was beet sugar, about three-fifths of which was produced in Germany, Russia, and Austria. These supplies of beet sugar have fallen off greatly during the war, so that Western Europe is now chiefly dependent upon cane sugar brought from other parts of the world. The United States, by far the largest consumer of sugar among all countries, has never raised more than one-fifth of its total supply of sugar; the balance has been imported from Cuba or other near-by countries. The situation at present is this: *Western Europe is obliged to draw upon the West Indian islands for supplies of cane sugar because of shortage of ships necessary to bring any commodities from a considerable distance. In consequence, there is not nearly enough sugar for our allies and ourselves.*

THE PROBLEM OF INCREASED PRODUCTION

Since we must send the Allies in large quantities wheat, meat — preferably fat meat — and sugar, the first question arises: how much of each shall we produce? Our food problem is acute, largely because *we do not produce as many bushels of cereals, and as many pounds of meat, in proportion to the population, as we did a few years ago*. In other words, our population is growing more rapidly than is our supply of food. In 1910 there was only 90 per cent as much land under cultivation in proportion to the population as there was at the beginning of the century. Our wheat production had dropped off 15 per cent per capita during those same ten years, and the production of corn had decreased 21 per cent per capita. We must take into account the fact that in the United States *only 9 per cent of our cultivated land is devoted to wheat, and less than 15 per cent altogether to the production of foods which are consumed directly by man*. Most of it is used for the purpose of growing feed for farm animals, who use in addition uncultivated areas on our farms and on the ranges.

To raise *meat* of a certain nutritive value requires more land, cultivated as well as uncultivated, than it does to raise wheat of that same value as food. Consequently, the number of farm ani-

mals in the United States is much smaller to-day than it was a quarter of a century ago compared with the population. For example, the number of cattle and pigs in 1910 was hardly any larger than it was in 1900, in spite of the great increase in the number of people, and *the number of sheep per capita decreased 48 per cent during the first 15 years of this century*. In California in 1880 there were 5,727,000 sheep, but in 1915 there were only a third as many, that is, 1,900,000. We can understand from these figures why mutton is more expensive than it was a few years ago, and why there is even now a decided shortage in the supplies of wool.

Farmers are being encouraged by experts to have flocks of sheep on practically every abandoned hillside, as well as to *increase the number of sheep kept on the average farm*. It is possible for at least a quarter of the farms in the United States to keep four or five more sheep each without difficulty. These experts are also urging suburban dwellers to "keep a pig," fed from the garbage of the kitchen and the waste material of the grounds. *They are recommending that the farmers of the United States pay particular attention to the raising of pigs. There are at least four good reasons for this last request.* (1) Pork and hog fats have formed part of the diet of European peoples for generations. (2) People exposed to hardships, or engaged in strenuous work, such as may be necessary at any time at the front, need animal fats more than any other food. (3) The number of our pigs can be increased far more easily and quickly than can the number of sheep or cattle. (4) A large percentage of the food of pigs is made up of articles that otherwise would be wasted. To be sure, a fairly large percentage consists of grain such as corn. Although our supply of corn this year is abundant it may not be so abundant next year. The government has sought to encourage the production of pork by fixing prices for pork, and by its general policy of protecting producers against profiteers.

From nearly every kitchen the table scraps, if supplemented with a small amount of grain and fed to chickens, would furnish an egg a day for each member of the family. However, chickens must have succulence. Lawn clippings can, to a great extent, supply this need. A few rabbits may be raised without great expense to supply some of the meat which now comes from other sources.

THE PROBLEM OF FOOD SAVING

All authorities agree that animal fats in large quantities are indispensable for persons engaged in hard work or subjected to unusual hardships. If the fighters in the trenches are to make good, we must keep up their supply of fats. It is absolutely necessary that the American people should send to Europe a very much larger amount of pork, bacon, lard, and other foods containing animal fat. We cannot depend solely on raising more food animals; *we must SAVE, and then we must try again and SAVE MORE.* It is an amazing fact that in the United States of America, in spite of high prices of meat, the average per capita consumption of meat in a single year has been more than 170 pounds.¹ That is, practically every man, woman, and child has been in the habit of eating nearly a half pound of meat per day. It is highly desirable that we should reduce that quantity because it is unhealthful. Of course, a large part of our meat supplies has been wasted, and we shall no longer permit waste,² but if we were to eat only two-thirds as much as we did eat, and if we were to save all that before was wasted, we should be able every year to send to Europe, or save for our boys in our own cantonments, an amount equal to at least 2,000,000 tons, or practically as much as the total supply of meat imported by Europe before 1914. At the same time we would have given ourselves a more healthful diet than we had before.

One of the ways in which we can really help is by eating meat not oftener than once a day and by eating no meat whatever on the days set aside by the Food Administration as meatless days. On any meatless day and, to considerable extent, on other days, we can get our supply of flesh food by eating fish, other forms of sea food, and

¹ The total consumption of meat per capita in the United States has always been about twice as large as that in European countries. It was 170 pounds per year in America, compared with 118 pounds in Great Britain, 111 pounds in Germany, 79 pounds in France, 70 pounds in Belgium and Holland, 64 pounds in Austria-Hungary, and 50 pounds in Russia.

² The extraordinary consumption of meat in America is due largely to waste in homes, but more especially in public eating places by serving large portions of meat which will not be eaten by one individual, but which cannot then be served again.

occasionally chicken or rabbit. Many people do not see why we cannot have meat ourselves and send these other articles to the front, but it is exceedingly difficult to keep fish and small animals for transportation to a distance, and they occupy far more space, which is limited and therefore valuable, than does meat of the same weight and nourishment. We can see, therefore, that it is a patriotic duty to use less meat and to find proper substitutes. *We must always keep clearly in mind the fact that for ourselves, at least for the present, there is a sufficient amount of food. We are not asked to starve or to eat less than we need.* We are asked, however, to save and keep on saving foods that are scarce, if those foods are needed in Europe, or by our troops. Surely, Uncle Sam can depend on us to do our part. At least we shall not be numbered among those thoughtless or vicious pro-Germans who stock up with war foods the day before the meatless or wheatless day, and thus, underhandedly, defeat the whole scheme, so far as it lies in their power. Nor shall we be among those unpatriotic persons who hoard foods needed in Europe or evade food regulations.

Meat is an important food chiefly because of the protein it contains. Protein is the foodstuff that is used by the body to build new tissue during growth and to repair body tissues in the adult. About 20 per cent, or one-fifth, of lean meat is protein. All flesh of animals, including fish, contains about the same amount of protein but the amount of fat and water present varies. Milk, eggs, fish, cheese, beans, peas, and peanuts are in the same class with meat as sources of protein. Any dish made from any one or a combination of these foods is a true substitute for meat, and any dish in which a small amount of meat is made to go a long way may be regarded as a meat substitute.

We cannot export 300,000,000 or 400,000,000 bushels of wheat this year even from our 1918 bumper crop, unless we make our wheat supplies go farther than they have ever done before, except during the months of wheat shortage last summer.

To a great many people, it has seemed as though they were asked to make too great a sacrifice. We wonder why Europeans can't use more corn, or at least some other cereal, but the reason is this: in Europe bread is baked very little in the homes of the people, and

bread for the soldier must be baked a long distance from the front. *They must have, therefore, for their bread, flour which will make a loaf that will HOLD TOGETHER, which is TRANSPORTABLE at least a few miles, and which WILL KEEP.* For these reasons it is impossible for them to use corn bread and it is equally impossible for them to use a large amount of corn in their bread. More than this, we cannot ship ground corn to Europe, because ground corn will not keep very well and ground corn will not stand the ocean voyage. We cannot ship corn in any other way, because there are no mills for the grinding of corn except in Italy and possibly southern France. For all these reasons it is impossible for the allies to make very much use of our large supply of corn.

The Food Administration has organized us into a great body of savers, but in addition it has adopted practical methods which make it possible for all to help. It has licensed all bakers, excepting those who do a very small business, and it has compelled them to make use of new bread formulas, the flour of which is not more than 80 per cent fine wheat flour. We cannot go on reducing indefinitely the amount of wheat in a loaf of bread, for, unless it is at least two-thirds wheat or rye, it will not hold together and will not, therefore, be bread at all. Consequently, we must do two things. *WE MUST EAT LESS BREAD*, even though that bread is not made entirely of wheat, and *WE MUST SUBSTITUTE OTHER CEREALS for the bread and the flour pastries which we formerly enjoyed.*

It is reported on good authority that the people of the Southern states consume almost as much of other cereals as they do of wheat; whereas five-sixths of the cereal food eaten by the people of the North is some form of wheat flour. Certainly it is possible for us to substitute enough oatmeal, corn meal, corn gems, barley cakes, and rye bread so that we can save for use in Europe all that her people will need.

When we realize that the troops of France and Belgium are, in a great many cases, not strong and healthy men, because almost every Frenchman and every Belgian who can shoulder a rifle has been called to the front, we ought to be glad to make a few sacrifices on their behalf. Think of the French women who are doing men's work, who toil with hoes, who follow plows in the fields! Are we

willing to eat bread, if it means that they will be obliged to go without the nourishing food which they need? *Send them more wheat and more meat; our chivalry will let us do no less.* To the homeless refugees of Europe, dependent to a large extent upon the bounty of the richest, and let us hope the most generous, nation in the world, we say, "Here, we have wheat, we have meat. It is yours, we give it gladly."

THE SCHOOLS AND FOOD PRODUCTION

There is a shortage of foods needed by Europe and suitable for transportation to Europe; there is also a shortage of workers in the fields. *The schools can help solve the labor problem and to some extent the whole problem of food production in two ways:* (1) they can supply within their own communities some of the agricultural labor of which there will probably be a decided shortage, and (2) they can prepare themselves as skilled agriculturists for a more advanced type of farm work or food production. In California nearly 40,000 high school boys and girls were employed last summer during a considerable part of the vacation, and about half of these were boys or "farmerettes" who worked on farms at tasks connected with the production of food. It has been suggested that the schools might send out boys to help the farmers during the busy seasons, even when school is in session. If they are in groups under the supervision of reliable teachers, they might prove a very great help as workers. It is possible that some plan may be developed by which groups of boys can be assigned for half of a school day to some work requiring only a little technical knowledge, for which they have been especially prepared by some agricultural teacher. A number of schools are following out the suggestion of state authorities and are offering *half-year introductory courses* which will prepare boys to understand the more necessary work required of a helper in the fields.

Some students, of course, take a great many courses in agriculture, specializing on different branches of food production. Possibly some of the more dependable boys can be leaders and teachers of younger or less experienced students. If so, they can be placed in charge of squads of other boys. They may be engaged at regu-

lar wages by farmers or they may be able to utilize land which they can plant themselves, if necessary under the direction of a regular agricultural teacher or expert. Some of them can do even more by cultivating intensively, possibly in, as well as out of school hours, a plat of ground of their own. During the last few years *boy farmers in a large number of American states have gained for themselves noteworthy reputations because of their production of grains or vegetables on very small plats.*

Some schools are taking up, either on their own initiative or under the provisions of the Smith-Hughes Bill, plats of land located near the school buildings, on which crops are raised by intensive cultivation. The back-yard gardens are exceedingly valuable as an additional means of keeping the family or the community supplied with necessary foods, especially if they are managed by industrious high school students who have studied that problem. Boards of education may help by taking up plats of ground and encouraging students during school hours to raise crops which the people need and for which those particular groups of students are fitted.

The problem of food production is one of very great difficulty because of our American system of leaving the work almost entirely to individual initiative. On that account it is necessary for the schools as well as the pupils to plan carefully, to undertake that work for which they are best adapted, and to work on this question as one of the most pressing and serious of all war problems. *If food is to win the war — and its share in victory will undoubtedly be great — then the schools must do a far greater work than they have done in the past.* Whether we as high school pupils have done much or little toward increasing the supply of food, can we not do more to help in this great work for home and country?

THE HIGH SCHOOL AND THE FOOD CONSERVATION PROGRAM

The success of the *Food Conservation program* will depend on the ability of the people to choose food wisely and make necessary substitutions properly. Unintelligent choice of food in times of peace is believed to be responsible for a large percentage of illness and inefficiency in school and adult life. Unintelligent choice will produce graver results when choice in food is limited and substitu-

tions have to be made. Under present conditions it is a patriotic duty and a duty to one's self to learn and apply the fundamental principles of food and nutrition. The government is sending out leaflets and pamphlets for this purpose. High schools already offer courses in foods and cookery that should be available to every student. Short courses in the choice of foods may be offered if time or equipment do not allow a laboratory course in cooking. The high school student bodies or similar groups should pledge themselves to carry out the recommendation of the Food Administration as far as possible. *A campaign on the part of high school students for a better understanding of the food problem, better choice of foods, and whole-hearted coöperation with the United States Food Administration, is the greatest immediate patriotic service open to high school students.*

No one ever made an appeal to a true American to do his share and found him in spirit, at least, unwilling. The question arises how far are we falling short of the standard which Uncle Sam demands of us? Have you stopped to think what happens to a soldier if he does not obey? A soldier, of course, rarely or seldom fails, but what about ourselves? If we fail to do what the Food Administration asks us to do, is there any reason why we should be treated very much more leniently than the soldier who is our representative at the front? Moreover, *there are only two ways in which this problem can be solved. The first is by CONCERTED VOLUNTARY EFFORT of all the people of the United States. The second is by COMPULSION.* Compulsion is the method which has been used in Prussia; it is the German way. Shall we thus copy one of the hateful forms of Prussianism? As there is no doubt of our patriotism, can there be any question that we will help every day, and in every possible way !

REFERENCES

- United States Food Administration, *Ten Lessons on Food Conservation*; Bulletins Nos. 6, 7, and 10.
Hunt and Atwater, *How to Select Foods*, Farmers' Bulletin 808.
Hunt, *Fresh Fruits and Vegetables as Conserves of Other Staple Foods*, Farmers' Bulletin 871.

Kellogg and Vernon, *The Food Problem*.

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
Nov., 1917, part II.

Rose, *Feeding the Family*, pp. 162-183.

Sherman, *Food Products*.

Taylor, *Wheat Needs of the World*.

United States Bureau of Education, *Home Economics Teaching Under
Present Economic Conditions*.

Hoover, H., "The National Geographic Magazine," XXXII, 187-
212.

United States Food Administration, *War Time Food Problems*,
"Literary Digest" (Weekly).

Best War Time Recipes.

War Economy in Food.

D. B. Houston, in "The Country Gentleman," Jan. 19, 1918, 3-4,
42.

E. Davenport, *Wanted: A Food Production Program*, in "The
Country Gentleman," Jan. 26, 1918, 10-11, 50-51.

W. H. Schrader, in "The Pacific Rural Press," Dec. 29, 1917, 669,
676-677.

Annals of the American Academy of Pol. and Soc. Science, Nov., 1917.

QUESTIONS

1. To what extent has there been a shortage of food in France and Great Britain? Give at least four general reasons why that is the case. Name at least four foods which it may be possible for us to take to Western Europe, and explain why those should be selected.

2. Why is there a real problem in the production of foods in America due to the lack of government control of production? What is the Food Administration? Who is head of it, and who is our local Food Administrator? What is meant by the Home Card? Give at least two provisions of your Home Card. Do you find any provision that you fail to observe?

3. Why is less meat produced in the United States than a few years ago? What effect has the war had upon the European production or supplies of meat? Compare the amount of meat used before the war by an American with that consumed by a person in Western Europe. Why is it desirable that we should have meat, and why is it wise to reduce our consumption of meat?

4. Give reasons why the Allies must import a large amount of wheat.

Show that practically all of that must have come from North America. Why was it necessary before September 1 for us to use very small quantities of wheat and to have wheatless days and wheatless meals? Why is it less necessary to scrimp in our consumption of wheat since the first of September?

5. Before the Great War what were the chief sources of the world's sugar supply? Upon which of those can we draw now, first because the sugar is produced, and secondly because it is near enough to be transported? What are the sugar regulations enforced at the present time? How much better off have we been in our supplies of sugar, wheat, and meat than the people of either France or England? How can we reduce our consumption of sugar?

6. Why are our high schools the best possible institutions in which to organize food-saving societies and to study food conservation? To what extent is it desirable that we should know the food values of different foods? To what extent can the food situation be improved by topics studied in high school, by classes for housewives, by woman food administrators? Why must the American people depend upon voluntary coöperation? Name five things that each of us can do to help win the war by saving food.

7. Has the war tended to increase or decrease the shortage of farm labor? To what extent have high school students helped to provide labor for their localities? Suggest ways in which high school students can help the American people to get a larger supply of food.

III. REORGANIZATION

8. UNCLE SAM'S FIGHTING FORCES

RAISING AN ARMY

SINCE the sixth of April, 1917, the United States has been at war with Germany. For more than two years and a half we had succeeded, in spite of increasing difficulties, in remaining out of the great world contest. During that time we had let contracts for the building of naval vessels, we had prepared to increase the numbers in our regular army, and had arranged that the national guard should be reorganized as an American army, if desired. Yet at the outbreak of the war there were only about 300,000 regulars and national guardsmen in the whole United States. Very little had been done to prepare the War Department or the Navy Department for real trouble, or to organize war councils and other branches of the government which make the American people an effective fighting force.

The American problem is stated in these words by President Wilson: "*It is not an army we must shape and train for war; it is a NATION.*" In this lesson and the next it will not be possible, however, to treat of the preparation of the nation, but some phases of that work have been considered in earlier articles. In fact, about all that we can do is to call attention briefly to the work accomplished in the creation of an army and navy. A little can be given on war reorganization also. The first problem in April, 1917, was to decide how a citizen army should be raised. Since ancient times military service has been a privilege as well as a duty of all adult able-bodied male citizens. *There was the choice of two systems, one of which provided for voluntary enlistments, the other made use of the draft.* To secure soldiers who should represent America abroad, the draft or selective service seemed fair and more democratic because it gives every man of draft age, without fear

or favor, an equal opportunity to serve his country. Since this national army was to be made up chiefly of infantry, it also was fair that, until the draft went into effect, young men should be allowed voluntarily to enlist in any service for which they had preference. *Thousands volunteered* for the aviation service, other thousands for ambulance corps work, and hundreds of thousands enlisted in the infantry service of the regular army or the national guard, which was being reorganized as a part of the national service. In addition, there were large numbers who entered the cavalry or the artillery service, joined the signal corps, or became identified with some other branch of the American army or navy.

A much larger number of soldiers are secured through the selective draft than in any other way. The first selective draft law was passed by Congress on May 18, 1917. It provided for the *registration* on June 5 of that year of all men between the ages 21 to 30, inclusive. In each voting precinct throughout the United States the enrollment took place on that day, a total of 9,780,685 men registering, of whom 1,275,902 were aliens and therefore not subject to military service in America.

These men were divided into five classes according to occupation or the number of their dependents. From Class I, chiefly single men without dependent relatives or married men whose families did not depend on their regular earnings for support, the first national army was organized. By the first of September, 1918, considerably more than two millions were enrolled in service. With the regulars and national guardsmen, they made an army of more than three millions, a million and a half of whom were in France.

At that time all distinctions between the different branches of the army were abolished, and at the same time our forces in France, which had been organized with French or British troops, were created into a separate army. To win the war quickly, a much larger number was necessary. To give us an army of more than five million soldiers, of whom four million can be sent to France by next July, on August 31 Congress passed the Second Selective Service Act, including all men from eighteen to forty-five inclusive, who were registered September 12. Most of the fighters from these

will come of course from the men under twenty-one, practically all of whom belong to Class I, whereas most of the men thirty-two or over are heads of families needed for the support of their dependents. These men in deferred classes must be engaged in essential industries and are treated as "slackers" if they are not at work. In spite of high prices, heavy taxes, and other real hardships these men are going forward, working hard and cheerfully, with determination to help win the war. The men selected by lot to wear the American uniform and fight the battles of democracy and civilization are first sent to training camps or cantonments. Special camps are located near many cities and towns, but the largest groups are in the thirty-two cantonments scattered throughout the country.

THE ARMY CANTONMENT

The building of these cities, for the cantonments are practically that, was accomplished during the summer and early fall of 1917, certainly a remarkable feat in itself. The buildings are of wood and two stories in height. In order to hasten construction, the tens of thousands of doors and windows were made in standard sizes, were constructed in mills throughout the country, and were fitted into place with slight delay. The total cost of the cantonments was \$15,000,000 less than the original estimated cost, another real achievement. So far as the topography of the ground in any particular camp permits, camps are in the shape of the letter U and consist of a long street of that shape, on either side of which are barracks for the soldiers, except at the center, where the officers' camps and quarters are located. Running off from the main U-shaped street are short, broad avenues which separate the quarters of the different battalions and regiments from each other. In the rear of the barracks are accommodations for bathing and for the supplies of the particular group. Wherever possible, a railroad or at least a spur comes close to the buildings occupied by the quartermaster and others having charge of the general supplies for the cantonment. In each of these cities there are about 45,000 men, besides officers. Since the men are to serve with troops of the Allies in Europe, they are organized on a plan

similar to the European model rather than on that of the American army before the Great War. In the infantry two hundred and fifty men form a *company*, which has a captain and five lieutenants, as well as non-commissioned officers for each squad. The infantry *battalion* consists of four companies and includes twenty-six officers and a thousand men, but the battalions of some other branches of the army include a smaller number of companies, and in some cases, for example, the Signal Corps, as few as two hundred forty-eight men. The *regiment* consists of several battalions of infantry, besides supply and machine gun companies. Each is commanded by an officer with the rank of colonel. An infantry regiment includes one hundred three officers and three thousand six hundred and fifty-two men. Most other regiments number less than one-half as many.

The men of the national army, that is, those who are recruited under the selective service law, are said to form, potentially, the finest army in the world. In the very beginning there were not clothes enough to go round, first, because there were more men than the quartermaster's corps had expected, and secondly, because the men were too big. In other words, there was a surplus of small suits and a scarcity of those in larger sizes. The men are kept busy most of the time from the reveille in the morning until taps demand that lights be out at night. Even if they are not obliged to carry their regular equipment of 68 pounds of "impedimenta," they do a full day's work. Meals are served at 6.15 A.M., noon, and 6 P.M.¹ The food is well-cooked, abundant, and substantial. Meat or fish is served two or even three times a day, but pastry seldom finds its way to the mess table.

¹ The following table gives some idea of a day in a cantonment.

Reveille:

First Call	5:45 A. M.	Drill — Assembly . . .	1:00 P. M.
March	5:55 "	Recall from Drill . . .	4:30 "
Assembly	6:00 "	Retreat — First Call . .	5:15 "
Mess	6:15 "	Assembly	5:25 "
Drill — First Call . .	6:50 "	Retreat	5:30 "
Drill — Assembly . .	7:00 "	Mess	Immediately
Sick	7:00 "		after Retreat
Recall from Drill . .	11:30 "	Tattoo	9:00 P. M.
Mess	12:00 Noon	Call to Quarters . . .	10:45 "
Drill — First Call . .	12:50 P. M.	Taps	11:00 "

In constructing the cantonments particular care was taken to see that each was placed on ground which was properly drained, and complete systems of water supply and of sewage were installed. The death rate, which in the soldier camps of the Spanish-American War was over twenty per thousand, that is, slightly higher than in an ordinary city with people of all ages, is now much lower, being only about eight per thousand. Some complaint was made last fall that not enough attention was paid to the health of the troops and that there were too few nurses to look after those who were in hospital, of which each camp has one, but much has been done to raise the health standard in all cantonments. Associated with each camp are quarters where the men can meet their friends or secure books and magazines. The Y. M. C. A., Y. W. C. A., K. C., and charity organizations have headquarters where books or magazines abound, amusements are offered, and the boys are made to feel at home. Especially at the hostesses' houses are men in uniform made welcome. Many additional religious, fraternal, and women's organizations are active in welfare work among the soldiers and sailors. To protect the boys on furlough, the sale of liquor near the cantonments has been restricted. In every possible way precautions are taken to safeguard the health and morals of the boys in camp. In all training camps, that is, in the army cantonments or in any of the scores of smaller camps and bases, the routine drill and preparation keep the men fit and are making them into true soldiers. An attempt is made to give them practice and experience, under British and French experts recently from the field of battle, similar to the work which they will be called upon to do at the front. For example, there are trenches which must be defended and stormed by opposing parties.

AVIATION AND NAVAL SERVICES — OFFICERS

A branch of our army on which the American people are counting especially is the *aviation service*. More than a year ago Congress appropriated \$640,000,000 for the construction of airplanes for use in the war. Under the direction of very competent motor engineers within less than a month a new light engine was developed for this work. This Liberty Motor embodies the best and the

simplest of all existing motor mechanisms, and although it weighs a hundred and fifty pounds less than the best French or English airplane motor, it will develop considerably greater horsepower. The airplanes first constructed under the immense appropriation of Congress were used almost exclusively for the training of student aviators, but some of them will be used for war work. At twenty-four training stations the students are being taught the rudiments of aviation and at nine grounds they receive their first instruction. The construction of battle planes did not go forward so rapidly, partly because auto factories could not be turned at once into first-class airplane factories, but in August, 1918, more than a thousand fighting planes were sent to France. With the construction in large numbers of such airplanes for combat or bombing, we are hoping to overwhelm the Germans and "win the war in the air." *Aviation must be highly coördinated with the artillery and the infantry.* It is used in watching the enemy's movements, in directing fire from hidden batteries, in fighting enemy planes that are trying to do the same thing, and in dropping bombs on the enemy's forces. It is hoped that the American people will be able to develop air fighting more fully and more effectively than the competent and efficient airplane forces of European belligerents.

A new navy could not be created nearly so rapidly as a new army could be organized. However, there are already four times as many naval vessels in commission as there were in April, 1917. At the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, *the American navy* was the third largest in the world, being exceeded only by those of Great Britain and Germany. It is impossible of course to make an exact comparison with others at the present time, but certainly very much has been done within the last four years, and particularly during the last year, to speed up the construction of war vessels of all kinds. *Ten new battleships, six battle cruisers, fifty torpedo boat destroyers, and more than 300 submarine chasers,* not to mention numerous other naval vessels, have been authorized and are under construction at the present time. At the date of our declaration of war, the enlisted strength of the navy was limited to 87,000 men, and there were not nearly so many as that actually in service. The number in the navy increased during 1917 to 150,000, and early in 1918

there were nearly 300,000 in the different branches of naval service. These figures include the marines, who are war soldiers, and the naval reserves, of whom a large number have been enrolled in practically all of the states which have sea coasts. The submarine service, the naval flying corps, and several other branches of naval service are also included. One notable work that the navy has done is to convoy fleets of transports to France, practically without loss of life. A single fleet last summer carried more soldiers than were in our army at the outbreak of the Great War.

The soldiers in service receive \$33 a month, and the seamen a somewhat similar wage. If a man in service is married, Uncle Sam sends approximately half of his pay to the wife. Additional sums are paid monthly for the support of the wives and children of all soldiers or sailors. The national government has appropriated a large amount in order that *the men may INSURE their lives* against accident or death. Since no regular insurance company would consider a soldier or sailor a good risk, provision is made by the government that they can insure their lives for not less than \$1000, nor more than \$10,000, at rates less than those which would be charged by regular insurance companies for ordinary citizens in good health in times of peace. In addition, Uncle Sam will pay definite sums to soldiers or sailors who are injured in the government service. The sum varies, however, with the number of persons who are dependent upon the injured patriot. *In case of death or total disability, a sum varying from \$25 to a widow alone, or \$57.50 to a wife and three or more children, is given monthly as COMPENSATION, not as a pension.*

In a democracy leaders usually rise from the ranks, but a democracy fears nothing more than a dictatorship. In a government of the people leadership does not always have the attention it deserves. Yet it stands to reason that in order to be efficient, a well-organized army must be intelligently led. For many years we have had a large number of schools or colleges in which the chief or sole work is the business of training officers. Of course the most famous and important of these are West Point Military Academy and the Naval Academy at Annapolis. As the number of officers carefully trained in these schools and colleges was not nearly enough

to provide our military and naval forces of nearly 2,000,000 men with the officers that they needed, *it was necessary at the outbreak of the war to start schools or camps for the preparation of additional officers.* There were nearly 200,000 applicants for training in the first of these officers' training camps, but only 40,000 were selected on May 15, 1917. A second series of camps on the same sites was opened in August with 20,000 men, and a third series with a slightly smaller number in January, 1918. The graduates of these camps have been highly commended by army officers. Many of them are now in charge of units of the national army. That they and the other soldiers of our citizen army will give a good account of themselves on the battle front is the opinion of those who are competent to judge. More than four hundred colleges are now being used to decide who will be good officers for our new army. These colleges will also give short courses to many young soldiers who are good material for further training as officers. In creating a fighting force, we may have made haste slowly, but our government has accomplished well a seemingly impossible task.

REFERENCES

- Hungerford, E., in *Everybody's Magazine*, 37 (1917), 23-29.
Carpenter, Frank E., Syndicated article published Sunday, March 3, 1918.
Fox, E. L., in *Forum*, 58 (1917), 461-470, 637-648.
Survey, 38 (1917), 3, 273, 349, 376; 39 (1917), 88-93.
Menkel, W., in *Review of Reviews*, 56 (1917), 58-62.
91st Division National Army, Camp Lewis.
National Service Handbook, 111-197.
The American Year Book, 1917, 285-298.
The (1918) World Almanac and Encyclopedia, 156-288.
Showatter, Fortesque, *National Geographic Magazine*, 332 (1917), 421-476.

QUESTIONS

1. How large was the American army when the war broke out? How large is it to-day? Have you any idea how many men volunteered for the army?
2. The first draft law was passed at what time? It provided for

the registration of men between what ages? Of those men how many have been organized in service?

3. The second draft law was passed at what time? It included men between what ages? How did the number of *soldiers* under 21, provided by the second law, compare with those under the first law above 21? Why did the large number of men over 32 furnish comparatively few soldiers?

4. Into how many classes of selected service are the men from 18 to 45 classified? Who belongs in Class I? Should men of the age and condition most suitable for soldiers be left in deferred classes if they are needed? If they have financial dependents, who will carry the burden of their family's support, if their country must send them to Europe?

5. What is an army cantonment like? Outline an ordinary day in camp. How are troops organized into companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, corps, and armies? What are unofficial organizations doing for the benefit or pleasure of the man in camp?

6. What is the difference between a training airplane and one used at the front? Name some of the uses made of airplanes in France. Why is there hope that with the development of giant airplanes we may "win the war in the air"?

7. Has our navy been growing since the beginning of the war? What work has it done in transporting troops to France; in destroying submarines; in looking after European coasts?

8. What is the *pay* of an American soldier? How much of it does he, personally, get? In case he is injured and is not insured, does he get any *compensation*? In case of his death what does his family receive? In addition to compensation how much might his family get through *insurance*?

9. Before the war where did we train our military and naval officers? Where have we trained them since war opened? To what extent are colleges being made preparatory and auxiliary training camps for officers? What qualities are possessed by our soldiers and officers which make them good fighters? Why can our officers not hope to compete in certain respects with those of France?

9. WAR REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

NEW BUREAUS AND BOARDS — WORK ACCOMPLISHED

THE reorganization of the army has not been much more radical than the reorganization of the government. The President of the United States, by virtue of the Constitution, is Commander-in-Chief of the military and naval forces of the United States. He is assisted by members of his cabinet, particularly by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. In each of these departments there are large numbers of bureaus, such as the Ordnance, Munitions, Quartermasters' Corps, Engineers' Corps, etc., which look after the different phases of war work. In the War Department there has been a great expansion since a year and a half ago. The Secretary of War has more responsible duties than he would in time of peace, and each of his assistants now is practically the head of a series of bureaus and activities which make him an officer almost as important as the Secretary of War in time of peace. There is also an Advisory Council of the War Department which has charge of important problems and which aids the secretary in deciding important questions.

Besides these branches of the War Department and similar, if less numerous, branches of the Navy Department, there is a General Staff made up of officers of the Army assigned to that work and a General Board for the Navy. The chief of staff is in a sense the directing general of the military forces not actually engaged in the field. Other branches of the war organization include the *Council of National Defense*, practically a war board, made up of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. Its purpose is the "coördination of industries and resources for the national welfare." It is aided by an Advisory Commission of able business men and by a very large number of committees and subcommittees. Important among its committees

is the *War Industries Board*. That board and some other organizations affiliated with it aim to speed up industry, coördinate the work of different plants and companies, decide which goods shall take precedence in transportation within the United States and for export, and see that as much is produced as possible and with as little delay and waste as can be managed. Another committee deals with labor problems; still another is designated the General Medical Board. The *United States Employment Service* of the Department of Labor has enlarged its work to a study of the labor supply of the United States with the idea not necessarily of mobilizing labor, but of calling attention to special demands for workers in particular fields or industries and to arrange if possible for transportation of surplus labor to the field where it is needed. With the listing of many businesses as non-essential industries, there has arisen a very serious task to transfer millions of workers to "essential industries," to those in which their help is especially necessary. During 1916 and 1917 a group of distinguished civilians with Thomas A. Edison as chairman, rendered valuable service as a *Naval Consulting Board*. The *Committee on Public Information* has done a worthy work in preparing, publishing, and distributing valuable pamphlets which have informed us about war problems and educated us to war needs. The *Food Administration* and *Fuel Administration* are examples of new nation-wide organizations. Federal control of railways has made necessary a new organization of transportation. Almost all states have *State Councils of Defense* with numerous committees and branches. These are working hard on the special problems of their state and aiding the general government in every way in their power. In California the State Council has published valuable surveys of our oil fields and of the coast near San Francisco. These are only a very few of the new war organizations and activities.

In spite of red tape, the division of authority, and administrative inefficiency — some of which unfortunately have been characteristic of American administration in time past — *the government at Washington has been able to carry through its new stupendous work of creating a national army, building cities for the housing of soldiers, providing equipment, clothing, and other necessities, and preparing*

airplanes, naval vessels, and munitions for a titanic conflict. To be sure, early investigations by a critical committee of the United States Senate disclosed certain shortcomings, namely, that there was some sickness in cantonments, that clothing had not been provided in sufficient quantities, that suitable rifles were lacking, and that the manufacture of machine guns had been delayed. Nevertheless, in spite of lack of coördination, a defect which of course cannot be removed in a short time, in spite of unnecessary delays, and some stupid mishandling of serious problems, our national government has accomplished a marvelous amount of valuable and serious work. No one can read the summary given by Mr. Baker, Secretary of War, before a Senate committee, nearly a year ago, without understanding better than before how great was the task undertaken by our government and how much more had been accomplished at that time than even most critics had thought possible. As Secretary Baker showed, the aim of the government was to create an army, and not necessarily to wait for rifles or other equipment before beginning preliminary training of troops. Considering the fact that the government must have at its disposal shipping of several tons for every soldier sent to Europe, the Secretary's promise that early in 1918 a half-million American soldiers would be giving a good account of themselves in France proves the remarkable achievement of the government. We all know what a glorious share our marines and soldiers had in driving the Hun from the Marne salient. We can hardly imagine what marvelous work will be done next year by several million Americans from our bases in Lorraine and elsewhere.

NEW CONCENTRATION AND PROPOSED UNIFICATION

It has been suggested that reorganization and development have produced a new need not only for better *coördination* between old departments and new organizations, but for far more *concentration* of authority in the hands of one person or board. Germany centralizes almost all authority in the hands of her *General Staff*, and particularly in the hands of the field marshal and quartermaster general. *Great Britain has a large war cabinet* made up of representatives from all parties, although the Liberals control a majority

of the members. *The direction of war affairs is handled by a WAR CABINET* consisting of the Premier, David Lloyd George, and five assistants, which has chief control of war problems from the governmental point of view.

In addition, Great Britain really has a *board of directors* made up of captains of industry who hold important positions in control of food, shipping, and industry. The British government has co-ordinated its different branches and has unified and centralized control to such an extent that all critics extol the fine business organization our British cousins have developed for the conduct of the war.

In the United States we have been so busy creating an army and working out problems that the questions of coördination and concentration have not yet been worked out fully. Unity of action is maintained largely through the war powers of the President and through the personal influence of President Wilson. *In the work of coördination*, the administration is hampered somewhat by the American system of government, which gives Congress the right to decide what organizations there shall be and what powers each shall have. It is impossible, except by direct authority from Congress or by the tacit permission of the law-making body, to create new divisions of any department or to develop very much more fully any departmental organization. *The task of coördination, concentration, and unification is one of greatest difficulty, but it is highly necessary that the different bureaus and branches should work together as a single, effective, harmonious machine. It is absolutely necessary therefore that they should be reorganized in order to get far more effective results.*

In order to secure proper concentration and coördination, Congress passed the Overman bill, which during the period of the war concentrates, in the hands of the President, authority to carry on any and all executive or administrative functions necessary for the prosecution of the war. It gives the President the right to modify, abolish, reorganize, and practically to create bureaus. It allows him to transfer the work of any official, bureau, or department to any other. In fact, it is expected to bring about absolute unification and concentration through granting the President practically dictatorial powers

of an administrative type. Coördination would be one of the means by which unification would be brought about. In order to win the war, it is undoubtedly necessary that many practices of our American governments, such as division of authority, which have delayed the making of laws and therefore have tended to safeguard rights of the individual citizen, must yield to the need of efficient action. As President Wilson wrote more than a quarter century ago in describing the highly concentrated and autocratic government of the Southern Confederacy, war needs must take precedence of all others. In his own words, "Everything gave way, even law itself, before the inexorable exigencies of war." We hope that in this war, law will not have to give way as it did in the Confederacy.

What was true then is true now. So to-day we must be prepared, if necessary, temporarily to make many sacrifices in order that America shall be triumphant and that democracy and Western civilization shall be preserved.

SOME AUXILIARY WAR ORGANIZATIONS

The Fuel Administration is a good example of war reorganization for the purpose of meeting an extraordinary need. During most of 1917 more coal was produced and transported to different sections than had been mined in any previous year. Yet, so great were the extraordinary needs for coal on railroads and in manufacturing plants that there was a decided shortage even before the very severe cold spell of last winter. *The Fuel Administration*, created in August, 1917, with Dr. Harry A. Garfield as Fuel Administrator, fixes prices everywhere in the United States. It tries to keep up fuel supplies where most needed. It has also arbitrarily insisted that plants shall be shut down on "fuelless days" in order that coal may be secured for Atlantic steamships and by householders who otherwise would suffer from the intense cold. It has done a valuable work in conserving our shipping of gasoline, oil, and coal.

Early in the war nearly seven hundred railways voluntarily united and allowed a *Railroad's War Board* of experienced railway officials to coördinate all of the lines, to work out better plans for carrying passengers or handling freight, and to direct the general work of all lines. In December, 1917, however, freight conges-

tion became so serious that the national government took over all interstate railways. Mr. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, was made *Director of the Transportation Service*. He is assisted in each of the great areas of the country by an experienced and successful railway manager who actually directs railway affairs in his district. A large number of duplicating trains have been discontinued, and a great many economies have been introduced. Any one who has traveled in recent months realizes how necessary that was because of the immense amount of traffic required in carrying troops and war materials. In June the government took over the telegraph and larger telephone lines also. The railway situation illustrates the war problem and need better than anything else, with the possible exception of the food and coal problems, because it was necessary arbitrarily to commandeer the railroads; and the railway management, since it has been brought under national control, has placed governmental and war needs ahead of ordinary business requirements. For example, the Fuel Administration stopped, for a period of several days, the carrying of anything except coal or foodstuffs over any railroads of the northeastern part of the country. This was due in part to the shortage of coal in eastern cities during the longest cold snap in years; but it was due also to the need of furnishing coal to vessels bound for Europe and of preventing exporters from cluttering docks with goods which could not possibly be sent at that time.

Some of us do not think of *The Red Cross* as a branch of the government; yet it is, and it is the only organization of its kind, that is, an organization caring for the health, welfare, and morale of the troops, which is actually and directly connected with our government in its war work. The officers of the Red Cross, however, are not in a strict sense governmental officials, as they are paid out of Red Cross funds, and every cent of the Red Cross money is raised by private contributions.¹ The honorary head of the American Red Cross is President Wilson, and its membership at the beginning

¹ A special fund of more than \$100,000,000 was raised in a few days last summer. Another campaign for a similar amount was held in June, 1918. This fall seven different organizations will hold a concerted drive for a still larger sum. The boys and girls can help. Try competition between the different classes.

of 1918 was more than five millions. Its affairs are directed by a *War Council* with headquarters at Washington. At present hundreds of thousands of workers are giving part or all of their time without pay to this service, in their own communities or in Washington or at the front. *The Red Cross is made up of chapters* located in more than twenty-five hundred cities of the country. *Each local chapter decides what work it will do in its own community.* Some specialize on the making of hospital bandages; others devote particular attention to knitting sweaters; still others give attention to securing materials of a hundred different kinds to be prepared for use at the front. All keep the general organization supplied as rapidly as new goods or materials can be provided. In the different localities there are many other voluntary war organizations, such as the Navy League and a number of others which are working with and through the Red Cross. In the grammar schools and in most high schools earnest boy or girl workers are enrolled in the *Junior Red Cross*. There are scores of ways in which the students can help: by knitting, if wool is obtainable, by remaking garments, by gathering newspapers, rubber, bottles, and other articles, by helping in local Red Cross work certain hours a week, and by contributing nickels and dimes earned by working at odd times.

The work of the Red Cross in Europe is of great proportions and of inestimable value. Refreshment rooms and houses or shops are maintained at given places. There are several Red Cross hospitals owned and managed entirely by this organization. More than two-thirds of the six thousand hospitals in France are receiving bandages and other supplies, even some drugs, from this efficient organization. The care of the civilian population in desolated districts is frequently handled by the Red Cross, to the exclusion of all other agencies. The Red Cross sends out, twice a month, three ten-pound packages of concentrated foods to every American prisoner in a German camp. Because Germany has very little food and because the prisoners in camps get less than their share, these fortnightly supplies have frequently saved prisoners, especially those who are sick or wounded, from starvation and death.

The limits of this volume prevent our considering the hardly less valuable work of the Y. M. C. A., the Y. W. C. A., the K. C.,

the A. L. A., the Salvation Army, and other organizations whose activities must be left for later discussion.

THE SHIPPING PROBLEM

Some years ago Secretary McAdoo and President Wilson suggested that the United States should have a merchant fleet of its own. Congress did not approve. The problem of an American merchant marine has been a serious one in this country ever since the middle of the nineteenth century. At that time we had the second largest merchant marine in the world, one slightly smaller than that of Great Britain. About the time of the Civil War, the change from wood to steel construction for ships, the interference with American commerce by Confederate privateers, and the aid given by the national government to industry and to some extent agriculture, tended to discourage the building of American merchant vessels. During the later years of the nineteenth century, and the early years of the twentieth, less than one-tenth of our foreign commerce was carried in American bottoms. For the transportation of most of the rest we depended upon the British merchant fleet. Even the serious troubles which we had over neutral trade and the submarine campaigns of Germany since 1915 did not arouse the American people to the need of building an infinitely larger number of ships, until more than two years after the Great War broke out.

In 1916 the national government created an *Emergency Fleet Corporation*, a governmental organization which made contracts with shipbuilders for the construction of a merchant marine to be controlled by the national government. Encouragement was given to construct shipyards, and to speed up the building of vessels. We found, however, that a new industry of this type could not be created overnight. In spite of the most strenuous effort since this campaign started, the United States constructed to January 1, 1918, ships of less than two million tons burden. At first special attention was given to the making of *wooden ships*, but in recent months more stress has been placed upon the making of *steel vessels*. Since we did not have the shipyards, but did have unusually fine steel manufacturing plants, we have specialized on "*fabricated*"

steel ships. The steel plates are prepared in the steel plants, and are sent to the seaboard shipyards, where the ships are put together. Last spring the first *concrete ship* was launched from a shipyard on the Pacific Coast. If successful, and the experience of the French would indicate that they are, concrete vessels will help greatly to solve the danger arising from a shortage of merchant vessels.

There are numerous problems which interfere with the construction of a sufficient ship tonnage. Among these are the *lack of labor supply*. For example, plates of which ships are made must be riveted together, and there are not enough expert riveters. Another difficulty is the *lack of shipbuilding facilities*. A third is the *desire to make extraordinary profits*. A fourth arises out of *labor disputes*. Wonderful progress is being made, but it is doubtful whether much more than three million net tons¹ of shipping will be constructed during the calendar year 1918. However, in the single month of July, 1918, from our American shipyards were launched vessels of more than five hundred thousand tons burden — a tonnage twice as great as that destroyed that month by submarines and by mines, and by other war dangers. Still another problem is caused by the *extraordinary delay in shipping materials from America to Europe*. Although there is not as much foreign commerce for the whole world as there was before the Great War, nevertheless, a great many more tons of goods are being shipped *from* American ports, and are being shipped *into* French and British ports, than ever before in history. In consequence, there has been great congestion on the docks, and at times ships have been delayed in getting coal and other needed commodities before sailing. In France we have been creating new ports to accommodate vessels carrying troops or war materials, and we have been building new railroads to carry our men and supplies to the front.

These are a few of our new war organizations, interests, activities, and problems; they are typical of many others. We should learn

¹ In estimating ship tonnage we must distinguish between net tonnage and gross tonnage. There is a marked difference between the figures of the two. A vessel of 10,000 burden (net) will probably be registered as more than 15,000 tons, gross. Germany expresses losses by submarine in gross tonnage. The rest of the world usually speaks of tonnage as net.

what we can about any that may be brought to our attention. Can we doubt that we should loyally stand by the President and his assistants in the great and difficult work they are doing?

REFERENCES

Council of National Defense

- World's Work*, 33 (1917), 629-636; 34 (1917), 473-475.
 Clarkson, T., *Council of National Defense*, in *Scribner's*, 62 (1917), 182-191.
 Tarbell, I. M., in *Harper's*, 135 (1917), 841-847.
Council of National Defense Report.

Red Cross

- National Geographic Magazine*, 31 (1917), 423-431.
 Scheitlin, M. G., in *Review of Reviews*, 56 (1917), 616-620.
Survey, 38 (1917), 94, 162; 39 (1917), 181-185, 217-226.
 Smith, G., in *World's Work*, 35 (1918), 281-296.

Shipping

- Smith, J. R., in *Review of Reviews*, 56 (1917), 393-396.
 Hungerford, E., in *Everybody's*, 37 (1917), 114-125.
 Williams, D., in *Illustrated World*, 28 (1917), 400-402.
 Hard, W., in *The New Republic*, 12 (1917), 319-321; 13 (1917), 10-13, 39-41.
 Marvin, W. S., in *Review of Reviews*, 56 (1917), 63-72.

QUESTIONS

1. Give some idea of the work done before the war broke out in placing the American government on a quasi-war basis. What is the Council of National Defense? What has it accomplished? What is the War Industries Board? Explain the organization and work of the United States Employment Service.
2. Who is head of the Fuel Administration? What is the work of the Fuel Administration? Why has it been necessary to save coal? to reduce consumption of gasoline? What is the general nature of the work of the State Councils of Defense? Name the chairman and one other member of our State Council of Defense. Give the names of at least three committees of our State Council. Explain in some detail at least two things of value which the State Council has accomplished.
3. (Try to picture to yourself the situation in Washington in the

spring of 1917, with old bureaus and organizations which had had little but routine work for years.) Name several problems due to the marvelous expansion of organization and duties of different boards, bureaus, or departments.

4. Name at least a half dozen prominent business men who have accepted government positions in charge of war activities. To what extent has the government attempted to solve the problem of "co-ordination, concentration, and unification"? What power does the Overman act confer upon the President? Has our government at Washington been able yet to create as efficient a business organization as the British Government has done?

5. Why did the government take over the railroads and the telegraph and telephone lines? Have you any idea how much of the railways' business at present is given to transporting troops, or supplies for troops? Is there any reason why the government should not take over other necessary industries beside those dealing with transportation and communication?

6. What is the Red Cross? How is it organized? What do the local chapters try to do? Explain what work our local chapters have done since the outbreak of war. Is there a branch of the Red Cross, or a Junior Red Cross organization, in this school? What was accomplished by the students during the school year 1917-18? What has been accomplished or is being planned this year? Give some idea of the work done by the Red Cross in Europe.

7. Explain these names and tell what war work is performed by each organization: Y. M. C. A., Y. W. C. A., K. C., and A. L. A. What sums of money are being raised this fall or winter by these organizations? What is being done in connection with Belgian Relief work? French Relief work?

8. What kind of an ocean-going merchant marine did we have at the beginning of the war? To what extent did we have shipbuilding yards in 1916? Where are some of the largest shipbuilding plants at the present time? To what extent have we specialized on wooden ships, on regularly constructed steel ships, on fabricated steel ships, and on concrete ships? Why has there been such a demand for riveters?

9. Compare the tonnage of vessels constructed in a single month now with our total tonnage before the Great War broke out. Why has the submarine issue ceased to be of great importance? How do we manage to convoy our troops to France with practically no loss? Explain how the lack of ships has created a food problem and special difficulties in caring for our troops in Europe.

10. REORGANIZATION OF SCHOOL WORK

THE GENERAL PROBLEM

THE schools in war time are not the same as schools in time of peace. In general, their object is the same, but nevertheless there are problems, differences of outlook, and new needs which call for considerable reorganization. *Schools must be prepared to do the work which they attempted before the war broke out even better than it has been done in the past.* Possibly some may undertake a number of new tasks, such as giving *new short courses in agriculture, or domestic science, or history, or mathematics, or science, as a special preparation for those students who cannot afford to SPECIALIZE in those subjects.* To meet other and more general war needs the school must, in addition, give instruction on still other topics, for example, these "War Citizenship Lessons" which we are now studying.

It is necessary for us to keep before us constantly the importance of school work in the present crisis. We must not imagine that because there is a war the school fills a less vital place than it did two years ago. Quite the opposite is the case. No farmer is more foolish than the one who grinds his seed corn; but a DEMOCRATIC NATION that neglects its schools, especially in war time, is guilty of criminal folly even more disastrous.

War is one of the most strenuous of all businesses. There is keener competition between leaders and soldiers on the opposing sides than can be found in any ordinary business or profession. One reason for this is that mistakes in war are exceedingly costly to life and limb, and he who blunders usually forfeits his own life or the lives of others. We need well-trained men as gunners, as engineers, and as leaders in this titanic contest with Germany, and it is the general training even more than the specific preparation which counts in making them capable. Moreover, the success

of armies at the front depends more on proper supplies and support from home than on any conditions at the front. Marshal Joffre and other great leaders believe that the war is being won by the many *behind* the firing line (possibly far away) rather than by the few in the trenches. But the many will win because of training and because of efficient service. Our boys and the allied troops in France will not fail us; we must not fail them. We must know what they need, then we must do those things. Greater knowledge and higher efficiency are essentials for us as well as for them. They can get theirs in training camps, in service, and in actual combat; we must get ours in school and in our everyday tasks. We must not have low standards of excellence. Just as the science of warfare is improved constantly, we must keep improving our studies and methods. A famous aviator, for two years a prisoner of the Germans, declared that he must learn the art of aviation all over it has changed so much. We must not expect our schools to stand still, and we must not be laggards in the race.

After the war there will probably be competition among the nations, and within our own country, which will be sharper than any we have known in past years. In other words, not only will industries and activities connected with the war be speeded up, but a higher standard of efficiency will be demanded from workers in every field of endeavor. The boy or the girl who slights his high school education, or neglects it by dropping out, will find that he is likely to be left behind in the race. If he neglects this greatest of all opportunities because of some attractive opening outside of school, he may find that he has given up much for little. We all know that if a boy leaves school at fifteen, he will not be able, other things being equal, to do as advanced work as he might have done, or to occupy the positions of responsibility which he might have filled, if he had continued in high school and college until he was twenty-two. We know further that in general the man of forty will not only have earned more if he continues his education, than he would if he had left school prematurely, but that he is probably earning several times as much yearly as he could have earned with an incomplete education. We must not look at this subject chiefly from the money point of view, however, for the

purpose of education in America is not primarily to increase the amount of our wealth, nor to make educated people capable of earning large salaries. Its object is first the self-preservation of a self-governing nation, secondly, social development of the entire people, and thirdly, self-education and improvement for the individual.

GENERAL PREPARATION

The student is not always allowed to decide just what work he will take; he is frequently forced by the arbitrary arrangement of courses or by his own lack of preparation to select a group of subjects which is not of the highest value to him personally. He must not imagine that he should be entitled to pick and choose among all the subjects offered in the high school in order to complete a course which will enable him to graduate. To be well trained or educated he should have groups of subjects which go together, *general courses which give CONTINUED INSTRUCTION OR DEVELOPMENT work along certain educational lines* for which he is fitted. In other words, to be of real value *a high school course must be more or less unified*, and this unity must be secured in most cases by three or four years of some one subject, and by two or more years of at least one subject closely related to the first. By getting from five to eight units which are closely related, and worth while educationally and to him personally, he has laid a foundation upon which he can build later, whether he goes to college or not. *Since this is the foundation of his whole life*, he must see that the subjects are valuable in themselves, and indirectly if not directly related to the life work which he expects to undertake. The term indirectly is used advisedly, because in high school far better preparation can often be secured from subjects which are general and disciplinary rather than from those which seem more practical, because after all it is a *general foundation* which we are laying. It is therefore necessary that the student should not give all of his time in high school to subjects which are very much alike. It is essential that *a balance should be maintained* between the major subject and closely related subjects, on the one hand, and those subjects which are of secondary importance in the making of his

life foundation, but are of real value because they are of personal interest or because they tend to give training of an exactly opposite character from that furnished by the major work. The purpose of high school is not to turn out specialists either in theory or in practical work. The high school should, however, give a real education, if necessary complete in itself, because it has employed a building-up process which begins in the Freshman year and continues successively and progressively in the higher classes.

Among the new special war courses which it may be possible for schools to offer, if students find them of sufficient interest or value, are short courses on the more necessary *war mathematics*. Such a course could not be given to immature students, but would necessarily be left to the senior or junior year of high school. Whether or not it would call for a new or different type of textbook depends partly upon the need of a single textbook for such a course, and partly upon the teacher and classes in any school. *New shop courses* will undoubtedly be developed to meet new needs. These will give necessary foundation work and practical application of those principles; but they will probably limit themselves rather to the development of the work of specific occupations. In short, *they will of necessity be chiefly of the craft type*, that is, the kind of course in which a trade school specializes. Some of our better equipped technical high schools and colleges are already giving courses which will train boys and young men for the more difficult work in shipbuilding. Other courses could undoubtedly be made helpful, if they prepared for other branches of ship construction, munition manufacture, or the making of motors, or gave training to workers for other war industries.

Short courses in *agriculture* have already been proposed and are being worked out in very many high schools. In addition, it is probable that our agricultural departments will be able to give shorter and more practical but highly helpful general courses. *Domestic art courses* for girls may be able to eliminate much of the routine, and, from the war point of view, unnecessarily detailed work, and concentrate on cooking, on food values, on the utilization of dress goods materials, or on other subjects brought into prominence by the war. In *history* and in *science* something

similar may be attempted. A short helpful half-year course in *modern European history from the war viewpoint* is desirable for those who have had no European history whatever. Such a course would of necessity stress only those events, movements, and changed conditions which are closely connected with Europe to-day or with the Great War and its progress. A new and more practical short course in civics, to be given not at the end of a high school student's career but near the beginning may be worked out in the near future. More valuable, and if necessary, reorganized courses in *physics* and *chemistry* should attract more students than in the past. Until 1914 Germany's attention to science gave her factories and her armies certain advantages over those of nations that neglected scientific education.

No school can make all of these changes. Most schools will wish to make very few of them. *The most necessary reorganization will be impossible if the students drop out or fail to understand what preparation is best for life as well as for war needs.* Let us remember that at least two of the greatest leaders of the war owe their leadership primarily to their education. Wilson, the clear-visioned statesman, and Foch, master strategist, are superior to their associates chiefly through their better grasp of their problems and their clearer comprehension of wise solutions.

[REFERENCES

- Becht, J. G., in *National Education Association Report* (1916), 935-940.
Dunn, *Social Studies in Secondary Education*, U. S. Bureau of Education (1916), Bulletin No. 28.
Marvin, C. H., in *School and Society*, 5 (1917), 696-701.
Elementary School Journal, 17 (1917), 397-431, 485-520, 550-575, 627-649.
Young, J. R., in *Educational Review*, 53 (1917), 122-136.
National Education Association, *The Reorganization of Secondary Education*, United States Bureau of Education (1913), Bulletin No. 41.
Dean, *The Schools in War Time and After*.

QUESTIONS

1. If the war has speeded up most industries and has made us eliminate non-essentials, should it not temporarily affect our school courses? If there is deadwood in our courses, would it not affect them permanently?

2. If it is important to educate and train an American nation, would not the schools have a very important work in that great task? Would not most of the work be done through the students who are now in school? What has the government done to help high school and college students to remain in school? Does it attempt to prepare college students for officers? If so, how? What is the S. A. T. C.? Give some idea of the value of education from the purely military point of view. What does that seem to prove regarding the value of education from other points of view?

3. To what extent is the leadership of President Wilson and Marshal Foch due to their education, that is, to their understanding and grasp of the general and political problem in the one case, or of the military problem in the other? Name some other leaders of the war whose education has been the chief essential in their success.

4. From the financial point of view, why is it wise to be near the top among the skilled, trained workers and leaders, rather than farther down among the more unskilled, among whom competition is great?

5. In selecting a high school course, why is it necessary that a student should select a first-class *general* course? Is such a general course possible without a major subject about which the course is built and one or two minor subjects closely related to the main subject? Is it not wise therefore to make careful selection of the main course in which the student specializes? In the making of electives, what should be kept particularly in mind?

6. Name some old courses which are particularly valuable because of present war conditions. Can you give a suggestion of ways in which those courses can be made more helpful to students? Can you name one new course for which there is likely to be demand? What particular present need would it meet? What would be its general educational value, and its special value in connection with the present crisis?

7. Why is a student helping to win the war when he studies hard? In spite of the great value of war work done by students, why are regular school duties even more important? As a student in this high school, what are you doing as a patriotic duty? What should you do more than you are doing, in order to prove your patriotism?

CONCLUSION

MORE than a year has passed since the United States became engaged in war with Germany. It has been a period of changes, of new conditions, and of trying problems. Brought face to face with this conflict, we have been forced, first of all, to learn why it occurred and what it was all about. This has been a task for which the school is especially fitted, because our schools are pre-eminently that part of our great civic organization which devotes particular attention to a comprehension of important subjects and preparation for important duties. To the other subjects and courses offered in the school, it has therefore been desirable that there should be added a study of the recent *past*, to determine what are the real *causes* of the war, of the *present*, to learn what war *conditions* exist and what are the most pressing *needs* to-day, and of the *future*, to discover what *problems* must be considered and if possible solved.

The work of the school deals not only with *comprehension* of school subjects, and of public or individual needs, but also with *preparation* of the student for his work in life. Its work is incomplete unless the student realizes the *general nature of citizenship*, and of the rights and duties of citizens. He must appreciate also the fact that there is a *school citizenship*, which to him as a student is a very important part of general public citizenship, and he must realize that *war conditions create also new relations, and rights, and obligations* which make it possible to speak of *war citizenship*. These lessons have suggested some changes which are creating a new war citizenship and are calling for new and higher standards in school citizenship. The war illustrates, as do very few events in time of peace, the fact that the better citizens we are, the more we are expected to live up to our *opportunities* and to fulfill our *obligations*. In time of peace, the way that society is organized makes it possible for people to earn a living, to acquire

wealth, and enjoy life without apparently being called upon to give back as much as they get; but, *when war comes, the fact is emphasized at once that our country demands services and sacrifices which it is our civic duty to perform.* A study of war citizenship therefore brings out more clearly than can a study of civics in time of peace the distinction between a good citizen who sees his duty and does it, and the indifferent citizen, who because he does not know, or because he is not willing, fails to do what his country needs. The war period brings incessant and radical changes; and *it gives opportunity for men, women, and children to develop a true "war conscience" and to see that the right changes are made.* Only well-informed citizens are able to create the kind of public sentiment that we need; only intelligent citizens can make the best reorganization of schools and business to help win a war. This intelligent citizenship can be acquired far more easily in the schools than outside; for it must be based upon knowledge, and must include a real understanding of why and how we must obey those in authority, and develop a willing coöperation with one another.

The purpose of school work, however, and particularly of war citizenship lessons is not to enable us to *know*, but to help us to *do*. We must learn what we can do, and be prepared to do it, but we should also understand what we cannot do, and be willing to refrain from doing it. There is great need that we should stand back of the President, should support the government in spirit as well as in letter, and should coöperate constantly with those about us. In President Wilson's proclamation announcing the enactment of a selective service law, he used these words, "The men who remain to till the soil and man the factories are no less a part of the army than the men beneath the battle flags. *It is not an army that we must shape and train for war; it is a nation.* To this end our people must draw close into one compact front against a common foe. But this cannot be if each man pursues a private purpose. All must pursue one purpose. The nation needs all men; but *it needs each man*, not in the field that will pleasure him most, but *in the endeavor that will best serve the common good* . . . the whole nation must be a team in which each man shall play the part for which he is best fitted . . . it is a new manner of accept-

ing and vitalizing our duty to give ourselves with thought for devotion to the common purpose of us all."

Five millions of our men have been enrolled in service, and are fairly well prepared to take active share in the great conflict, modern crusaders against a twentieth century menace to Christianity and civilization. But the war is not to be won solely by the troops at the front, because it is not chiefly a struggle between the armies of Germany and the armies of the Allies. It is in a true sense a contest between the German nation and kultur, trying to dominate the world, and the other peoples, seeking to preserve the best of western civilization as we knew it before the war, and aiming not only to make the world safe for democracy, but to develop and perfect that civilization and that democracy far more than in the past.

In these lessons nothing has been said concerning conditions on which peace shall be made. It has been necessary for President Wilson to state fully terms of peace in order to make clear the position in which America stands and the principles which we represent; but it is unnecessary at this time that the schools should discuss that subject. *Not peace but WAR IS STILL OUR PROBLEM.* It is a war greater than any other in history, and *a war which must be won, because a conflict which ends in COMPROMISE will be time and effort wasted.* Never again will the great Powers of the western world be more closely united against an overpowering danger. If we fail to destroy the menace now, it will grow and it will do more than grow; it will destroy the possibility of future unity among its present enemies. In the course of this war America and the Allies must, of course, become even more closely united than they are at present, and the unity must lead to persistent and determined effort which must end in the complete and overwhelming defeat of Germany. The world must not be asked to go through another struggle like that of the present. The American people must see that such a struggle is not allowed to recur. After this war Germany must not be able to create again such a situation as has existed in recent years. It is a case of NOW OR NEVER. This struggle may be long and bitter, or the "grand smash" may come soon, but it must be thorough. The war will not be over as

soon as the fighting ceases, nor will most problems be settled when peace has been concluded.

The weight of the war burden falls more heavily upon our young men who have gone willingly to the front, but it is our responsibility as well as our opportunity. Not all of them have been appointed officers, nor are many of them permitted to serve in the front trenches, but we know that all are ready and willing to do the least as well as the greatest task which may be set for them. For those of us who remain at home, a new organization is necessary and we should be ready to take the place that shall be assigned to us. This may be directed by those in authority at Washington. It is not their desire to force upon us orders to do work that is unpleasant, nor do they wish to control the private lives of our people; but they are compelled to take some measures to gain our help in the conservation of fuel, in the saving of food, and in the prevention of waste. Let us do our part, not because we are afraid our failure will in the future bring a scarcity of supplies, and that scarcity will lead to suffering, but because we are anxious to obey and coöperate gladly, as the first duties of a good citizen.

Can we not as individuals be truly soldiers of our country voluntarily by practicing conservation, by producing necessities, and helping the Red Cross or other auxiliaries of the war? Can we not do our bit by comforting friends and relatives at home or by letters and remembrances sent to our boys at the front?

To us are denied many opportunities which adults might have to share in the organization of armies or in the carrying out of war policies, but in our homes, in the school, and in the voluntary war organizations with which we are associated we can find ways constantly to help Uncle Sam. In the fact that these are every-day affairs, unheroic and inconspicuous, lies the importance of the work which every one of us can do and is doing. Even if we do not understand fully the reason for saving this food rather than that, or of making sacrifices, or of obeying in spirit the suggestions of our President and others in authority; at least let us feel that we shall not spend our time objecting or complaining, but that we shall help, without criticism, in the spirit of a cheerful giver, knowing that what we have done is our best and that our best is worthy of a true patriot.

APPENDIX I

USING WORN MATERIALS

1. Examine garments carefully and note how best they can be utilized and whether they are worth remaking.
Remember that remaking involves often more work than the making of new garments.
One or more of the following processes is often needed :
 Cleaning : *a*, washing ; *b*, removal of stains ; *c*, sponging, pressing, etc.
 Redyeing.
 Ripping.
 Very careful planning in cutting.
 Combining of materials, if not enough of one, etc.
2. In remaking remember there is a saving of the price of material ; a conserving of material which otherwise would be wasted.
3. Do not put *unnecessary* labor on remaking.
 For example, if pieces of old garments are large enough for recutting, do not take time to *rip* seams ; cut them off.
4. Have pieces *clean* and *well pressed* before beginning to cut. Cut garment apart previous to sponging, washing, removing spots, pressing, etc. It is much easier to work with smaller, flat pieces.
5. If remodeling is to be worth while, the finished garments must —
 1. Be *attractive*.
 2. Have *wearing quality*. Consider this before beginning.
6. Choose patterns very carefully. Note the size and shape of pieces with which you have to work and choose a pattern the design of which gives pieces which will cut from material you have without conspicuous piecing. For example, if pieces are not long enough for skirt length, choose skirt with yoke, tunic skirt, or two-tier skirt, any of which require shorter lengths.
7. In remaking, piecing may often be successfully hidden under decoration, if carefully planned.
 Plan to piece under tucks, pleats, folds, where braid is put on, insertion is set in, etc.
8. Place whole pattern on and *know* just how you are going to get whole garment from pieces before cutting any one piece.
9. In combining materials consider carefully color and texture of materials for attractive and harmonious results.

APPENDIX II

DRAFT CLASSES AND ORDER IN WHICH SELECTIVES GO

THE Provost Marshal General has authorized the following classification of selectives into five groups, indicating the order in which they will be called to service :

CLASS I

1. Single men without dependent relatives.
2. Married man (or widower) with children, who habitually fails to support his family.
3. Married man dependent on wife for support.
4. Married man (or widower) with children, not usefully engaged; family supported by income.
5. Men not included in any other description in this or other classes.
6. Unskilled laborer.

CLASS II

1. Married man or father of motherless children, usefully engaged, but family has sufficient income to afford support during absence.
2. Married man, no children; wife can support herself decently and without hardship.
3. Skilled farm laborer engaged in necessary agricultural enterprise.
4. Skilled industrial laborer engaged in necessary industrial enterprise.

CLASS III

1. Man with foster children dependent on daily labor for support.
2. Man with aged, infirm, or invalid parents or grandparents dependent on daily labor for support.
3. Man with brothers or sisters incompetent to support themselves dependent on daily labor.
4. County or municipal officer.
5. Firemen or policemen.

6. Necessary artificers or workmen in arsenals, armories, and navy yards.
7. Necessary custom house clerk.
8. Persons necessary in transmission of mails.
9. Necessary employees in service of United States.
10. Highly specialized administrative experts.
11. Technical or mechanical experts in industrial enterprise.
12. Highly specialized agricultural expert in agricultural bureau of state or nation.
13. Assistant or associate manager of necessary industrial enterprise.
14. Assistant or associate manager of necessary agricultural enterprise.


CLASS IV

1. Married man with wife (and) or children (or widower with children) dependent on daily labor.
2. Mariners in sea service of merchants or citizens in United States.
3. Heads of necessary industrial enterprises.
4. Heads of necessary agricultural enterprises.

CLASS V

1. Officers of states or the United States.
2. Regularly or duly ordained ministers.
3. Students of divinity, or who were such on May 18, 1917.
4. Persons in military or naval service.
5. Aliens.
6. Alien enemies.
7. Persons morally unfit.
8. Persons physically, permanently, or mentally unfit.
9. Licensed pilots.
10. Members of a well-recognized religious organization on May 18, 1917, whose creed forbids its members to participate in war, and whose convictions are against war.





Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide
Treatment Date: MAY 2001

Preservation Technology

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION

111 Thomson Park Drive
Cranberry Township, PA 16066

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



0 007 705 502 2